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This thesis investigates to what extent the U.S. experience in the Vietnam 
War and the lessons learned from it, a phenomenon known as the "Vietnam 
Syndrome," influenced the decision by the United States not to intervene during 
the early stages of the Balkan conflict. 
The study will argue that the Vietnam War was used as a historical 
analogy for the current situation in former Yugoslavia. I further argue that this 
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For decades the legacy of the quagmire in Vietnam hred self-reproach, 
mistrust, and doubt of the efficacy of American military power among the 
American public and military, and government leaders. Fear of another 
Vietnam has shaped every American decision to use force abroad since 1975. 
This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "Vietnam Syndrome." 
This thesis traces the development of the Vietnam Syndrome and 
elaborates on the impact of the Vietnam War on American public, political, and 
military culture. 
The paper will argue that the U.S. experience in Vietnam influenced the 
decision not to intervene in the Balkan conflict, that the Vietnam War was used 
as a historical analogy to the current situation in former Yugoslavia, and that this 
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We did not believe that it could happen. No one thought it was possible. It 
seemed to be completely unthinkable. We thought that such horrors were alien to 
the heritage of modem European sensibility, especially at the end of the second 
millennium. How wrong we were. Overnight one of "the riders of the Apocalypse"1 
rode into our lives-war, Croatia was at war! 
Day after day the eyes of Croatian citizens were turned towards the open sea 
waiting and hoping for the U.S. armed forces to arrive and stop this madness. Yet, 
evening after evening Croatians went to bed with the thought "Tomorrow they 
will come." Nobody came, not the next day, not the next week, not the next year. 
Not at all. 
To intervene or not to intervene was the question the U.S. was struggling 
with. Some toxin called the ''Vietnam Syndrome'' had snuck into the brains of 
American political and military leaders and kept them from coming to the rescue of 
the desperate Croatians. 
ill 1990, the Croatian people, in free and democratic elections for the first time 
in their history, voted overwhelmingly for independence. The following year, the 
newly elected democratic government chose to secede from the predominately 
communist, renamed socialist, regime of President Slobodan Milosevic. ill June 
1991, President Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker, made a highly publicized 
1 "The four riders of the Apocalypse" are: plague, war, famine, and death. In The Holy Bible, 
Revelation 6:3, it is written: "When the Lamb opened the second seal, I heard the second living 
creature say, 'Come!' Then another horse came out, a fiery red one. Its rider was given power 
to take peace from the earth and to make men slay each other. To him was given a large sword." 
1 
visit to Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, and threw his weight behind preserving the 
crumbling state.2 
The NATO Supreme Commander, John Galvin, told Belgrade's 
Politika that NATO would not intervene in any Yugoslav civil war. 
To round off the incentives to military action, the U.S. Secretary of 
State, James Baker III, insisted that 'the United States continues to 
recognize and support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.'3 
Although, U.S. approval to invade the seceding republics was never given, Baker's 
message urging that Yugoslavia hold itself together was read by :Milosevic and the 
Serb-dominated army as a green light to use force to prevent Croatia and Slovenia 
from seceding. 
In the appeasement analogy promoted by columnists and editorial writers of 
influential newspapers and magazines in the United States and Western countries, 
:Milosevic was portrayed as Hitler and James Baker as Neville Chamberlain, 
replaying the Western acceptance of Germany's swallowing of Czechoslovakia in 
1938.4 And indeed, 
As it was, the Serbs learned another lesson-that there was no 
Western resolve and that they could push about as far as their 
power could take them. s 
Several days after Baker's meeting with Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia 
and the "Yugoslav People's Army'' started the aggression. 
2 Frank Wright, "Blunt Talk on Balkans: Ex-Ambassador Condemns U.S. Policy that He Says 
Allowed War to Be Inevitable," Star Tribune, April2, 1995, p. A19. 
3 Mark Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, London: Mandarin, 1994, p. 
48-9. 
4 David B:inder, "Criticized as Appeaser, Vance Defends His Role :in Balkans," The New York 
Times, January 19, 1993, p. A1. 
s Wright, "Blunt Talk on Balkans," p. A19. 
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A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the U.S. experience 
in Vietnam, the lessons learned from it, which are described in the U.S. as the 
"Vietnam Syndrome," influenced the decision not to intervene in the Balkan 
conflict The paper will argue that the Vietnam War was used as a historical analogy 
to the current situation in former Yugoslavia and that this method was an 
improperly used historical parallel. 
Why is it that Americans, the leaders of world democracy, needed so much 
time and find it so difficult to prevent or to intervene and stop the Balkan tragedy? 
To find the answer to this question, I had to come to the United States. During my 
military education at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, I realized how 
complex and difficult the decision to send troops overseas is. 
Although this thesis does not focus on the origins of the complex war, it is 
necessary to bring up important events in Yugoslav history. This history must 
be analyzed for its significance in shaping American attitudes and reactions 
towards the events between 1991 and 1995. The following data provides a brief 
account of Yugoslav history as it relates to the current situation. 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As recognized independent, democratic states, Croatia and Slovenia were 
attacked by a nationalist aggressor who tried to seize their territories and expel 
or exterminate their people. For decades, the Western world fought the Cold 
3 
War precisely to abolish this type of belligerent behavior. Milosevic and his 
desires for a Great Serbia6 were obviously the driving force behind this war, not 
"ethnic tensions" or "ancient hatreds" between Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. 
However, many government officials, including President Bush, used this 
argument to justify non-intervention? 
1. What actually was Yugoslavia? 
More than seventy years ago, President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen 
Points forcefully enunciated the principle of self-determination but the right to 
self-determination, as stated in Wilson's Fourteen Points has never been realized 
in this artificially created country. At the Versailles Peace Conference, in June 
1919, Wilson insisted on the creation of a Yugoslav state from the remnants of 
the Austro-Hungarian (Croatia and Slovenia) and Ottoman (Serbia and 
Montenegro) empires.8 World War II created the first opportunity for a unified 
Yugoslav state. The idea of Yugoslav statehood among Croatian, Slovenian, and 
Serbian leaders "had little to do with real internal harmony."9 Liberation from 
6 For over a century and a half the Greater Serbian policy of conquest has been devised, 
constructed, and carried out on the Balkan territory. Since the 1850s the ruling Serbian 
oligarchy has been the core and the driving power of this policy of subjugation, the master-mind 
for preparing and organizing violence. The roots of the Great Serbia are well documented in Ivo 
Banac's article, "Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism: The Yugoslav Non-Revolutions of 
1989-1990," pp. 141-59, chapter in Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Cambridge, MA: 1990. See also Boze Covic; ed., The Roots of Serbian Aggression: 
Debates. Documents, Cartographic Reviews. Zagreb: Centar za Strane Jezike, 1993. 
7 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, August 10, 1992, v. 3, p. 617. President Bush's remarks at 
news conference, Colorado Springs, Colorado, August 6,1992. 
8 Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1991, pp. 5-7. Ali Rabia and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan 
War, Stony Creek, Connecticut: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993, pp. 140-1. John Zametica, The 
Yugoslav Conflict. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, pp. 6-8. 
9 lvo Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," chapter in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, 
eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994, p. 433. 
4 
foreign rule and the dream of independence were the main motivations to form 
a sovereign state. From the very beginning the new state faced the problem of 
integrating diverse peoples with different religions, customs, and cultures into a 
single administrative entity. 
The course of subsequent political life was rendered inexorable by 
the first Yugoslav constitution, the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921, 
which created a centralized unitary system-as opposed to 
Croatian federative schemes-and gave Beograd and the Serbs 
effective control of the state apparatus and national finances.10 
It must be stated that until the creation of Yugoslavia, there was no 
history of Serbo-Croat wars. In fact, the Croats and the Habsburg Serbs had a 
record of cooperation in fighting joint enemies.11 
The experiment of Yugoslavia as a country effectively ended in 1928 when 
Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croat Peasant Party, was shot on the floor of the 
National Assembly in Belgrade. During the years 1929 through 1941, the 
collapse of the nation was prevented only by the use of the Serbian-dominated 
army.12 In 1938, of 165 generals in the armed forces, 161 were Serbs, leaving 
only two Croats and two Slovenes.13 The country collapsed in 1941, and was 
partitioned among Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. 
10 Ibid, p. 435. 
11 Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, p. 6. The Croats and the Serbs fought together, for example, 
in the 1848 revolution against the Hungarians. See also Lederer, "Nationalism and the 
Yugoslavs," p. 416-18. 
12 In fact, the Yugoslav Army (Y A) was not a new army of the newly composed country 
Yugoslavia, but a continuation of the Royal Serbian Army (RSA): uniforms, procedures, and the 
language of command were the same as they had been in the RSA. Moreover, between the two 
world wars, only Serbian generals served as Defense Ministers. In 1938, only 10 percent of the 
Y A officers corps were Croats. Ivo Banac, National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, 
Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 150-3. 
13 James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 115. 
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With the end of World War II, the postwar communist phase either 
suppressed or mismanaged the national question. The Communists tried to 
resuscitate the ideology of a supranational Yugoslav identity. They forgot that 
... they did not win the war under the banner of Yugoslav 
unitarism; they won under the banner of the nationallib~ration of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and so on.14 
This "ideology of Yugoslavism" provoked tremendous opposition among the 
Communists of Slovenia and Croatia who saw this as an opening for the revival 
of Serbian hegemony. This conflict came to a peak in the early 1960s, and by the 
1970s, sections of the Communist Party itself had become exponents of specific 
national interests. This meant the end of its effective unity and the beginning of 
a crisis that led to the downfall of the second Yugoslav state. During this period, 
the United States had an interest in maintaining the status quo in Yugoslavia; 
united Yugoslavia was a part of the Cold War system.15 
U.S.-Yugoslav relations commenced with the Cominform's denunciation 
of Yugoslavia in June 1948. The U.S. government quickly understood the 
importance of the break in the Communist world. President Harry S. Truman 
seized the opportunity and provided Yugoslavia with desperately needed 
economic and military help. The regime survived thanks to this generous aid. 
14 From an interview with Ivo Banac, professor of history and Master of Pierson College, Yale 
University: cited in Ali Rabia, "Separating History i!om Myth," chapter in Ali Rabia and 
Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War, p. 141. 
15 Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War, pp. 143-4, 
Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 25, 45-6, PaulS. Shoup, Problems of Balkan Security: 
Southeastern Europe in the 1990s, Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990, pp. 36-9. 
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In exchange, socialist Yugoslavia did not become a member of the Warsaw Pact 
and 
... played a critical role for U.S. global leadership during the cold 
war: as a propaganda tool in its anti-Communist and anti-Soviet 
campaign and as an integral element of NATO's policy in the 
eastern Mediterranean.l6 
However, with the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat had diminished and 
U.S.-Yugoslav relations were no longer seen as vital to U.S. interests, which led 
to a strategic downgrading of Yugoslavia in East-West relations. But the recent 
conflict has clearly demonstrated that ''the Balkans continued to matter in a 
variety of ways to Europe and the rest of the world."17 For Robert Dole, Senator 
from Kansas, it was the right time to state that 
... the United States urgently needs to review its policy toward 
Yugoslavia to determine the best means for encouraging the 
growth of democracy and restoration of full human and individual 
rights for all of the people in Yugoslavia ... We cannot forget that 
these nations did not join today' s Yugoslavia voluntarily.18 
In order to come to a decision, an honest and fair judgment of the 
situation was needed. It seemed impossible; the Belgrade lobby in the U.S. 
government was too strong, and supporters of the Serbs in high political 
positions had already developed private business connections in Serbia. Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was Ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1977-
lo Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, p. 25. 
17 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, p. 3. 
18 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Civil Strife in Yugoslavia: The United States 
Response," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1•t sess., 
February 21, 1991, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 37. For full 
transcript see Appendix A. 
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81, and the director of the National Security Council, Brent Scow croft, was 
Assistant Air Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade in 1959-61, and wrote his 
doctoral dissertation on the country. '"Lawrence of Serbia' as his less flattering 
juniors at the State Department called him was a key figure in the day-to-day 
policy-making of the U.S. response to Yugoslavia's deaths throes."19 If anything 
... Eagleburger and Scowcroft were inclined to keep some distance 
from the Yugoslav imbroglio because questions about their private 
business ventures with Yugoslavia-conducted in the period 
between their diplomatic careers and their return to governmental 
service-had already threatened public embarrassment over 
possible conflicts of interest.2o 
U.S. Representative Helen Delich Bentley of Maryland had some strong feelings 
on this subject. After stating that both of her parents came from Serbia, she went 
on to distort Yugoslav history before the U.S. Senate by proclaiming a well 
known war criminal, General Draza Mihailovic, leader of the Serb Chetniks in 
World War II, as a hero. She also asked to put in the record two prepared 
statements; one was from a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the U.S. Air Force, 
Nikola J. Dragash, and another of Mr. Veljko Miljus. Both of them are Serbian 
Americans.21 
Unfortunately, in the coming years, U.S. policy continued to be geared 
toward helping Yugoslavia maintain its independence and territorial integrity. 
19 Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 39. 
20 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, p. 155. 
21 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Civil Strife in Yugoslavia: The United States 
Response," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1•t sess., 
February 21, 1991, pp. 48-67. 
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The Soviet Union played a part in the "maintain the federation" attitude towards 
Yugoslavia. 
Anti-interventionists constantly used the argument that the world 
was filled with other Yugoslavias to justify the West's failure to 
intervene on its doorstep .. .It was the specter of Soviet collapse and 
then continuing fission within the post-Soviet republics }Vhich 
haunted the imaginations of Western statesmen.22 
The West saw a parallel with the Soviet Union, and there was a fear that if 
something was done in Yugoslavia, it would have to be repeated in the Soviet 
Union. This the West did not want to do. 
C. THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 
By 1990, the signs of Yugoslavia's imminent break-up became clear when 
the first fully democratic elections in over forty years were held. Croatia and 
Slovenia, against the will of the West used the republic's right to self-
determination, a right recognized by the Yugoslav constitution. This was not a 
vote for complete secession, but clearly demonstrated Croatian and Slovenian 
desires to distance themselves from the central government and the communist-
led republic of Serbia. The turning point for the dissatisfaction of these republics 
came in May 1986, when Slobodan Milosevic became the head of the Serbian 
Communist Party. Milosevic's takeover came on the wings of a growing cult of 
personality, media manipulation, and a campaign to brutalize the Albanians in 
Kosovo. His innovation was in turning the Serbian Communist Party into the 
22 Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 340-1. 
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party of Serbian nationalism. Milosevic r~awakened the old Serbian nationalist 
myths and dreams of establishing a Great Serbia. He took the final step in 
March 1989/ when he virtually abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina. Milosevic first tried to seize control of the Yugoslav central 
institutions to dominate all Yugoslavia. When this plan failed he turned to his 
"Plan Bn- to create a Greater Serbia carved out of Croatia and Bosnia. Croatia 
and Slovenia favored a loose confederation and voted for administrative 
independence and democracy. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic showed 
his real face and publicly warned that any attempts toward independence would 
prompt aggressive action from Serbia in regard to protecting Serb minorities. 
He used the history of the Ustasha Army from WWII to create fear among Serb 
population. 
The renewal and evocation of wartime passions was made 
necessary by the political crisis of communism in Yugoslavia and 
the search for a new basis of legitimacy for power- especially by 
the leaders of the Serbian Communists, whose seat was in the 
federal capitat Belgrade.23 
Slovenia and especially Croatia became targets of a vicious campaign, designed 
to portray its leaders as latter-day Ustasha.24 However/ 
... the Serbian political opposition shares Milosevic/ s view/ whereby 
the western borders of Serbia ought to be drawn slightly east of 
Zagreb and Rijeka/ making much of present-day Croatia a part of 
23 Ibid, p. 7. 
24 In this connection it should be noted that the extent and real strength of Croat chauvinism 
during World War II can not as yet be fully assessed. Communist portrayals of the Ustasha 
movement and their leader Dr. Ante Pavelic are nonsense. Now, after Communistic regime, a 
comprehensive research can be undertaken with regard to the "losers" of World War II in the 
Balkan lands. 
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emerging Great Serbia. These ambitions ... are behind the current 
Serb demands for political autonomy in Croatia.25 
On August 17, 1990, thousands of armed radical Serbs in Knin, backed by the 
military might of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), sealed off towns and 
blocked roads in Croatia in order to create a separate state of ':Republica Srpska 
Krajina." The best indication that the war had little to do with the protection of 
ethnic Serbs in other republics was provided by the fact that Serbian aggression 
started first in Slovenia, the republic with the most homogenous ethnic 
characteristics. 26 
1. Slovenia Fights 
Until the war broke out we could think about various 
options, even about whether some Yugoslav idea would succeed. 
But when war came it was clear to me that it was the end of it all. 
Vasil Tupurkovski, 
Macedonia's representative 
on the federal Presidency in 1991.27 
On June 27, 1991, YP A tanks criss-crossed Slovenia aimed at exerting 
maximum pressure on the Slovenia's leaders and persuading them to back 
down. But it achieved the very opposite, and Slovene forces engaged them in 
combat. This intervention provoked non-Serbs in the military and Slovenes in 
the YP A, shortly thereafter, to resign en masse, to be followed rapidly by their 
Croat colleagues. The weakness of the remaining Yugoslav army, now 
25 Banac, "Post-Communism as Post-Yugoslavism," p.182. (emphasis added) 
26 Out of the total of 1,881,864 inhabitants in Slovenia, 90.5% were Slovenes, and 1.4% Serbs. 
Co vic, Roots of Serbian Aggression, Historical Map, No. IX. 
27 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences, New 
York: New York University Press, 1995, p. 156. 
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consisting of only Serbs and Montenegrins, was very obvious during this short 
war. An army once thought of as invincible was defeated within ten days by 
untrained and under-equipped Slovenians. In total, eight Slovene and 39 YP A 
troops died, and 111 Slovene and 163 YP A troops were wounded, while more 
than 2,500 YPA conscripts were taken prisoner.28 Many suggest that they 
decided to wait for the decisive battle in Croatia and Bosnia. 
A ten-day war between the YP A and Slovenia ended with the mediation 
of the European Community, giving the impression that the dissolution of the 
country was not so difficult after all. However, within two months, war spread 
to Croatia. 
2. Croatian War 
The armed hostilities between the Croatian government and Serb rebels 
that started in Knin in August 1990, had become an open war between Croatia 
and YPA. The first deaths were recorded on March 31, 1991, while the first 
atrocity took place in Eastem Slavonia on May 2, 1991. At their own risk, foreign 
reporters could effectively go wherever they wanted and thus became witnesses 
to the barbarity of Serb irregulars and the YPA.29 Systematic uethnic cleansing" 
by Serbs was reported. 
The most celebrated battles were those for Vukovar and Dubrovnik. In 
August, 1991, Vukovar was encircled by the YPA and pounded mercilessly for 
87 days. The defenders surrendered, and those who fell into the hands of Serb 
28 Ibid, p. 159 .. 
29 Ibid, p. 163. 
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irregulars were executed en masse. The YP A assault on Dubrovnik finally put 
the lie to Serbian claims that the war was about Serb rights in Croatia. Of 
Dubrovnik' s 70,672 inhabitants only 5,735, or 6.7 per cent, were Serbs.30 Though 
hopelessly out-gunned, Dubrovnik refused to surrender, as the YP A demanded, 
and appealed to the world for assistance. At this stage, Croatia (and Slovenia) 
won international recognition from Germany. The YP A made one last, 
desperate attempt to halt recognition by shooting down two unarmed 
helicopters of the EC Monitoring Mission above Croatian airspace on January 7, 
1992, and attempted to pin blame for the attack onto Croatia.31 However, only 
one helicopter was destroyed and the survivors were able to testify who was 
responsible for the deaths of five of their colleagues. The shooting proved 
counter productive and recognition went ahead as scheduled on January 15, 
1992. Germany recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and other 
members of the European Community followed. The United States refrained 
from recognizing the new states and continued to blame the independence 
declarations for the outbreak of the war. Yet three months later, on 6 April, the 
United States recognized Slovenia and Croatia, and together with the European 
Community, extended recognition to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Croatian and Serbian forces in Croatia agreed to the deployment of 14,000 
U.N. peacekeepers and as they began arriving in Croatia, another, more 
destructive conflict was already boiling over into war. 
3o Ibid, p. 169. 
31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, p. 402. 
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3. Bosnia-Herzegovina Tragedy 
The international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina technically made the 
YP A soldiers a foreign occupation force. The YP A began to withdraw from 
Bosnia on April 27, 1992, but turned over all heavy mortars and up to 54,000 
men and officers, fully armed and equipped, to the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian 
Serbs aided by the Yugoslav army quickly seized almost two-thirds of Bosnia 
and began their atrocities. Not since the Nazis' attempt to exterminate Jews and 
other ethnic groups, has Europe witnessed such a callous disregard for 
international human rights law and fundamental human decency, as committed 
by the Serbs. Current estimates suggest that the total number of persons killed 
in Bosnia alone exceeds 200,000 and that more than 60 per cent of the population 
has been displaced. 
From the very beginning of the Bosnian war, the atrocities were primarily 
against the Muslim minority but were also directed against the Croats that were 
settled in Serb claimed areas. This was part of the Serb strategy to achieve an 
ethnically clean territory at the end of the war. 
The Bosnian war began with the shooting in Sarajevo on AprilS, 
1992 ... 0ne might also mark the outbreak of hostilities with the 
April 2 raid by paramilitary units from Serbia on Bijeljina, a town 
near the Serbian border ... The Serb forces took over the town and 
murdered at least several dozen Muslims. From that day until 
now, the war has unfolded according to a precise plan: non-Serb 
territories are encircled and Serbian majority areas are linked with 
one another. 'Ethnic cleansing' has been an integral part of the 
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entire plan. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights and former Prime Minister of 
Poland, put it 'Ethnic cleansing' was the objective, and not a 
consequence, of the war.32 
Rape became instrumentalized to become an effective weapon in uethnic 
warfare." 
Rape is an instrument of war, a very efficient weapon for 
demoralization and humiliation ... The rapes in Bosnia are not only a 
standard tactic of war, they are an organized and systematic 
attempt to cleanse (to move, resettle, exile) the Muslim population 
from certain territories ... The eyewitness accounts and reports state 
that women are raped everywhere and at all times, and victims are 
of all ages, from six to eighty.33 
The European Community recently put the number of rape victims at twenty 
thousand. The Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation of War crimes 
estimates that fifty thousand women were raped up to October 1992.34 Even if 
numbers are highly controversial, the mere fact is atrocious. 
Europe and the rest of the democratic world simp~y continued to close 
their eyes to these crimes. It seemed that for most this was a regrettable event 
which could be ignored. In July 1995, former U.S. Secretary of State, Lawrence 
Eagleburger, asserted: 
They have been killing each other with a certain amount of glee in 
that part of the world for some time now ... 35 
32 Stojan Cerovic, "Letter from Serbia: 'Greater Serbia' and Its Discontents," chapter in Rabia Ali 
and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War, pp. 259-267. 
33 Slavenka Drakulic, "Women Hide Behind a Wall of Silence," chapter in Rabia Ali and 
Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War. pp.US-120. 
34 Ibid, 118. 
35 Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1996, p. 124. (emphasis added) 
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The phrase "in that part of the world" provides to the audience an immediate 
feeling of an alienation: these people are not our concern because they are 
something "other," they are something u different." Senator Phil Gramm went 
further and in his campaign comments, in November 1995, stated that uall of 
Bosnia [and its four million human lives] was not worth one American 
soldier."36 Everywhere statesmen and military leaders quoted Bismarck who 
had said that 
... the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian 
grenadier. 37 
But they forgot that in fact two world wars were fought in the Balkans and the 
bones of many grenadiers were buried there. Obviously Bismarck was wrong so 
Europe and the great powers could not escape the fad that the Balkan was part 
of Europe. 
While Yugoslavia's towns and villages were systematically destroyed, 
Western governments argued without any sense of urgency, in sterile debate 
over the options available to them to stop the war. Russia, Great Britain, and 
France, as well known Serbian allies, backed Serbia and opposed all U.N. 
decisions. 
President Mitterrand showed how his long memory for France's 
old allies and past enemies had not been dimmed ... The French 
president told German newspaper readers in November 1991, as 
Vukovar was in its death throes, 'Croatia belonged to the Nazi 
block, not Serbia.'38 
36Jbid, p. 128. 
37 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, p. 88. , 
38 Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. xvi. 
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Throughout six months of fighting, Britain's Foreign Office chose not to send a 
single diplomat to Zagreb. 39 France and Russia were more direct Their senior 
diplomats said that their interests were closer to the Serbs and saw Bosnia as a 
danger of Islamic expansionism.40 With this conception, these states were 
echoing warnings of Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, who in an 
interview stated: 
Serbian war aims had to take account of the risk to Europe of 
allowing any Muslim state in Bosnia. The biggest concern for us is 
that any Muslim state can be a stronghold for Muslim terrorism in 
Europe.41 
It is hard to imagine that on the eve of the 21st century politicians display such 
attitudes. 
Western diplomacy believed that it could be a bit more laid-back about 
Yugoslavia than it used to be in the extremely competitive atmosphere of the 
Cold War. To some it seemed a strategic interest of Western Europe and the 
United States was not engaged there. According to Jacques Poos, the President 
of the European Council, the chance to intervene as mediators in the Yugoslav 
crisis was 
... the hour of Europe. If one problem can be solved by the 
Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country 
and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.42 
39 Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course, and Consequences, p. 174. 
40 Ali Rabia and Lawrence Lifschultz, "Introduction: In Plain View," chapter in Ali, et. al, eds., 
Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War, pp. xlvii-xlviii. 
41 Ibid, p. xlviii. 
42 Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 32. (emphasis added) 
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The hopes of the democratic forces of Yugoslavia were that the same criteria 
would be applied as it was to the rest of Eastern Europe: favors and help where 
free-market and liberalism advance and active disapproval where human-rights 
offenses were being committed. The question one must now ask is, why 
President Bush was not referring to Yugoslavia when he said 
... the United States should not seek to be the world's 
policeman ... But in the wake of the Cold War, it is the role of the 
United States to marshal its moral and material rescues to promote 
a democratic peace. It is our responsibility- it is our opportunity-
to lead. There is no one else.43 
Rather than talk and debate ideal solutions, it was more sensible to talk of 
limiting damage and of easing conflicts and tensions inevitable in a country such 
as was Yugoslavia. 
D. RESPONSIBILITY AND OPPORTUNITY TO LEAD 
... If the U.S. were to intervene at all, it would be desirable to do so 
early in the crisis, before hostilities began, and while escalation 
might still be avoided. 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
June 15, 197944 
Beginning in 1990, there were several opportunities for the U.S. to 
intervene in a preventive way in the Yugoslav crisis. The first came on 
November 28,1990, when the Central Intelligence Agency issued warnings to the 
43 President George Bush, "Address at the West Point Military Academy," United States 
Military Academy, West Point, NY, January 5, 1993. 
44 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War, New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1995 , p. 3. 
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White House and predicted that a violent breakup would occur umost probably 
in the next 18 months."45 
The situation is characterized by growing nationalism and 
separatism and an alarming worsening of ethnic relations, all of 
which is expressed in violence, a drastic threat to public order, 
peace, and citizens' safety.46 
The CIA's detailed report on the Yugoslav crisis was published in The New York 
Times in August 1990. It is reasonable to conclude that the decision makers 
received an advance copy long before it was released in The New York Times. 
However, regardless of the numerous warning signs, the situation in Yugoslavia 
developed on its tragic course without outside intervention or interest 
When he was president, George Bush wanted Yugoslavia to hold 
together. He stayed silent when Croatia declared independence in 1991 and 
when Serbia, the most powerful republic, took over the Yugoslav Army and 
used it to conquer almost a third of Croatia. On December 25, 1991, Mr. Petar 
Poljanic, Mayor of Dubrovnik at the time, sent an appeal to President Bush: 
The President of United 
States of America 
Mr. George Bush 
sos 
Dear Mr. President 
We have heard of U.S. warnings to the JNA [the Yugoslav Peoples' 
Army], announced yesterday. After 25 days of our agony, it was 
the first light at the end of the tunnel. But our enemies are now on 
the door of the city. They already bombed and destroyed almost 
everything we have, and the old city and the surrounding houses 
are the only thing we have left. They continue to bomb and make 
45 David Binder, "Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon," The New York Times, November 28, 




preparations to destroy house by house/ to destroy all our cultural 
and national roots. Dubrovnik will be lost very soon/ and only the 
name will be preserved. The only possibility is an active 
movement of the U.S. military forces to follow up the warning of 
the State Department. Maybe that the appearance of some 6th fleet 
ships in the neighborhood of Dubrovnik would be enough/ maybe 
some flights of Phantoms or something like that. Maybe the 
appearance of the U.S. monitors in Dubrovnik. But they_ should 
come with some very fast vehicle. The preserving of Dubrovnik is 
now a matter of hours. You are the only person in the world that 
can save the rest of Dubrovnik as well as 60/000 people that live 
here as hostages. 
Please help us. Dubrovnik will never forget your kindness. 
We look forward and expect a miracle of great the United States. 
Sincerely yours 
Mayor of Dubrovnik 
Petar Poljanic47 
Despite Croatian appeals/ President Bush and his administration stayed inactive 
and continued their previous policy of non-intervention. President Bush rejected 
using air strikes against Serbian artillery positions because he was reportedly: 
... haunted by the prospect of Vietnam-style escalation/ in which 
failure of a bombing campaign would be followed by calls for the 
commitment of substantial allied ground forces.48 
As the president himself stated: 
I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way 
into some guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia. We/ve lived through 
that once already.49 
President Bush recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992/ but stayed silent 
when Serbs continuously shelled and killed civilians in the Bosnian capitat 
47 Miljenko Foretic, ed., Dubrovnik u Ratu (Dubrovnik in War), Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1993, 
p. 587. All emphasis added. 
48 New York Times, August 8, 1992, p. A4. 
49 Ibid. 
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Sarajevo. Another opportunity that he could have used to justify stronger 
actions arose when journalists in the summer of 1992 discovered Serb-run 
concentration camps and other evidence of war crimes committed by Serbs. 
Western officials had been holding back news of such camps.50 After the 
revelations of the horrors of the Omarska concentration camp in August 1992, 
Western leaders came under pressure by the press and public to liberate the 
killing camps. But diplomatic staffs worked overtime to deny the use of the 
term "genocide" to apply to these events. Only one year earlier, in his 1991 State 
of the Union Address, President George Bush stated that the U.S. would 
... continue to lead in support of freedom everywhere, not out of 
arrogance, and not out of altruism, but for the safety and security 
of our children. s1 
This "new world order" which called for new foreign policy doctrines quickly 
forced the U.S. to reassess its responsibility as the only remaining superpower 
when conflict arose in the former Yugoslavia. But with an election looming, 
President Bush's advisers were reluctant to risk the popularity he had achieved 
during the Gulf War. 
When he was a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton called for resolute 
action to stop the Serb conquest52 In 1992, Clinton proposed the use of NATO 
air power to save Bosnians from 11 deliberate and systematic extermination based 
50 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. p. 125. 
51 President George Bush's "State of the Union Address," Congressional Records, January 1991. 
52 George Moffett and Jonathan S. Landay, "A War to Avoid," The Christian Science Monitor. 
December 7, 1994, p. 1. 
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on their ethnic origin."53 But as president, Clinton deferred to General Colin 
Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argued against using 
force, saying it would embroil the United States in another Vietnam-style war 
where no vital interests were at stake. According to the account in Elizabeth 
Drew's study,54 U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his aide Tom 
Donilon were major figures in persuading Clinton to give up his commitment to 
the "lift and strike" plan to stop the genocide and to turn to a policy of 
containment. On May 7, 1993, Christopher returned from Europe with the 
refusal by the NATO powers to stop the killings. In testimony before the U.S. 
Congress, he referred to "ancient antagonisms" and spoke of the Bosnian 
catastrophe as a "problem from hell."ss 
Among the most frustrating aspects of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia was the apparent ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping forces. By 
focusing the U.N. mission on the supply of humanitarian aide while refusing to 
stop the campaign of genocide, the Western policy makers showed a false 
humanitarism. In late 1994, and again in May-June 1995, hundreds of U.N. 
troops were taken hostages by the Bosnian Serbs and became an excuse to 
intervene.56 The uselessness of the U.N. peacekeeping forces became clear on 
53Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 126. 
54 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, 
pp. 157-63. 
55 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 127. 
56 Richard H. Ullman, The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Book, 1996, p. 200. 
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January 8, 1993, when the French peacekeepers were escorting the Bosnian 
Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Hakija Turajlic into Sarajevo. 
They were stopped at a Serb army check-point. When the Serb 
soldiers asked the French peace-keepers to open up the armored 
car-against their orders and with a certain knowledge of what 
would follow-they complied, then stood aside and watched as a 
Serb soldier shot the unarmed Dr. Turajlic dead. When the same 
French peace-keepers came home to France, they were decorated 
for heroism. 57 
The degradation of the peacekeeping role culminated in June 1993. After 
some peace-keepers were taken hostage and others threatened with being taken 
hostage, the people in the protected safe areas, Srebrenica and Zepa, who had 
been forbidden adequate weapons to defend themselves, were turned over to the 
Serb army for mass killings. After the British diplomats watered down the safe 
area resolution, Yasushi Akashi, U.N. Envoy of the operation in Bosnia, issued a 
U.N. report suggesting that Srebrenica be abandoned. It was a clear green light 
to the Serb army. On June 5, 1995, the Serb army violated the safe area and 
drove two thousand desperate refugees into the center of town. 
The Dutch officers drank a toast with General Mladic and wrote 
him a document stating the civilians had been treated properly, 
while Mladic had a pig slaughtered before the Dutch commander's 
eyes as an example of what happened to his "enemies" and as 
Mladic was having thousands of Srebrenica residents led away for 
slaughter. The Dutch soldiers retreated in their armored vehicles, 
running over and killing a number of desperate residents trying to 
flee the killings. When they returned to the Netherlands, they 
were decorated for heroism. 58 
57 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 133. (emphasis added) 
58 Ibid, pp. 207-8. (emphasis added) 
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For five long years the West, the European Community, the United States, 
NATO, and the United Nations, could just stand by as a Balkan War went on 
and kept saying: "We can not intervene!" Finally, after two million refugees and 
200,000 dead, the West intervened. In September 1995, NATO used air strikes to 
break the siege of Sarajevo. Total casualties against "invincible" Serb forces 
were two French pilots missing. When intervention came, Serbs collapsed right 
away. On November 1, U.S.-sponsored peace talks opened in Dayton, Ohio, 
with the presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia. On November 21, Balkan 
leaders agreed on a comprehensive settlement to the 43-month war in Bosnia. 
Many U.S. diplomats agreed that the political misuse of diplomacy in the 
Balkan war would led "to sharp diminution of American influence in the world 
and to a much more dangerous world."59 The distress over U.S. policy in the 
Balkan war caused the resignation of five State department officials.60 Mr. 
Warren Zimmermann, by far the most senior and influential man of those who 
quit, was the last U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia. In his book, Origins of a 
Catastrophe, he writes: 
The Vietnam Syndrome and the [Colin] Powell doctrine proved to 
be powerful dampers on action.61 
59 George Kenney, "U.S. Foreign Pohcy Fails the Moral Challenge of Bosnia," The San Diego 
Union-Tribune, August 29,1993, p. G1. 
60 George Kenney, Jon Western, Marshall Harris, Steven Walker, and Warren Z:i.nunermann 
resigned to protest the inability of the United States and ii:s allies to end the war in Yugoslavia. 
See Martin Sieff, "Fifth Aide Quits State Over Bosnia," The Washington Times, January 7, 1994, 
p. A1. 
6l Anthony Lewis, "How It Happened," New York Times, September 16, 1996, p. A17. 
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E. QUESTION 
The question is: does the United States still use the Vietnam War as a 
historical analogy to justify to project American military power abroad, and whether 
the U.S. applied the Vietnam Syndrome to Yugoslavia? 
I found that the specter of Vietnam, even two decades after the war had 
ended, kept reappearing in American political debate. This is significant because it 
has affected U.S. use of force thereafter and allowed wars to go on.62 The Vietnam 
War was used as an example for the decision not to intervene in former Yugoslavia; 
consequently, it influenced U.S. foreign and security policy once again, in perhaps 
its greatest challenge since the end of the Cold War. 
This thesis will critically examine what the Vietnam Syndrome is, how it 
developed, how it was applied in former Yugoslavia, and whether it was a proper 
or improper use of historical analogy. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
This paper is divided into several sections: 1) a descriptive analysis of the 
Vietnam Syndrome and the lessons learned from it, 2) a comparison of the military 
and political dimension of the Vietnam and Yugoslav conflicts, and 3) implications 
and conclusion. 
62 Congress voted to prohibit U.S. military involvement in 1976 in Angola, and in 1977 during 
the Ethiopian-Somalia conflict. 
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Specifically, Chapter IT traces the development of the Vietnam Syndrome and 
elaborates the impact of the Vietnam War on American public, politic and military 
itself. In the last part of this chapter one can see that the leaders of other countries, 
too, evaluate the lessons of the Vietnam War. 
Chapter ill makes an effort to distinguish the multiethnic character of the 
Partisans who fought the Germans in the World War IT and the Serb militias of 
today. The chapter shows that the Serb soldiers attacked with massive heavy 
weaponry against lightly defended villages and retreated when faced with serious 
military confrontation. 
Chapter N provides implications and conclusions regarding the challenges 
the U.S. forces would have encountered if they have entered the Balkan conflict 
earlier. The paper concludes with the lessons which can be drawn from the 
Yugoslav War. 
G. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The primary method of extracting information about the U.S. relationship to 
Vietnam and Croatian Wars was content analysis. 63 The research started with major 
newspapers and periodicals in 1991 and closed with the November 1995 issues. The 
Lexis-Nexis Library Index was used with the following search words: Yugoslavia, 
and Vietnam, and U.S., and 1990. This search request resulted in 1,119 references 
63 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 1992, p. 63. To find out how theory can be proven in sociological research, Richard 
H. Wells and J. Steven Picou (1981) conducted a content analysis of a sample of articles. 
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being included in the analysis. 64 One of the biggest surprises in this study was the 
number of articles referencing to the U.S. view of the Vietnam and Yugoslav wars. 
The methodology I used for this thesis was the qualitative historical analysis, 
based on primary and secondary sources. Sources included books, articles, 
periodicals, and scholarly journals on the history and current events, and the 
analysis of daily newspapers in the context of Yugoslav conflict 
64 While searching for materials which named Yugoslavia and Vietnam, several other trends surfaced. 
Neither of these types of articles were included in the study. 
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II. A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM SYNDROME 
A. INTRODUCIION 
Serious decision making in politics and everyday life_ often finds us in 
situations in which we know very little about the probabilities of various possible 
outcomes. Regarding that, decision makers often resort to analogical thinking. 
Previous decisions, certainly, 11 can serve as source analogs, helping them with their 
impending targets,"65 but they are not always the best way to reach an optimal 
decision. There is the danger that analogies more often can corrupt thought than aid 
it. 
Political and military decisions with enormous human consequences 
"provide the most dramatic domains in which historical analogy can make a strong 
contribution to decisions."66 But the trouble is that the environment in which history 
is being made is dynamic. Nations together with their leaders rise and fall, new 
alliances and international bodies are built, new technologies change the ways in 
which wars are fought and peace is maintained. For all these reasons, it is 11 difficult 
to glean strong generalizations from the historical record and use them to set current 
policy."67 
65 Keith J- Holyoak and Paul Thagard, Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought, Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1995, P- 140. 
66 Ibid, P- 155. 
67 Ibid, P- 155. 
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This chapter traces the development of the Vietnam Syndrome and elaborates 
on the impact of the Vietnam War on the American public, political, and military 
culture. Evidence from this chapter shows that a coherent lesson was constructed 
from the Vietnam War. It explains the U.S. Armed Forces' reluctance to implement 
organizational action in the wake of its defeat This is the Vietnam Syndrome. 
For decades, the legacy of the quagmire in Vietnam had bred self-reproach, 
mistrust, and lingering doubt in the efficacy of American military power. Fear of 
another Vietnam played in every American decision and this referred to the 
Vietnam Syndrome. 
Learning lessons from the Vietnam War has been a preoccupation of U.S. 
analysts since the moment the war ended. But the leaders of other nations, too, have 
certainly gained insights from the Vietnam War. The last part of this chapter focuses 
specifically on how the Serbs, contemplating a possible military confrontation with 
the United States, evaluated the lessons of the Vietnam War for their policies toward 
the United States. 
B. THEPRICEOFWAR 
The Vietnam War was America's longest war, lasting from 1945 to 1975,68 or 
from 1965 to 1973 if you count only the time American combat troops were involved. 
In 1965, the regime of South Vietnam was in danger of falling. President Johnson 
68 The U.S. involvement really began in 1945 at the end of World War II, with President 
Truman's decision to back France' conquest of its former colony, Vietnam. 
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and his advisors turned to the Munich analogy to publicly justify his decision to 
send American combat troops into Vietnam. 
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peacef because we learned 
from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of 
aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then 
another country/ bringing with it perhaps even larger a:Q.d crueler 
conflict/ as we have learned from the lessons of history.69 
It was the first war the United States lostf although due to superior power 
and mobility/ the U.S. won every battle. It was the first war brought into the family 
living room by television. For the soldiers who fought itf it was a new kind of warf a 
guerrilla war without front lines, against an enemy who often wore civilian clothes. 
It was probably the most divisive conflict for Americans since the Civil War and 
perhaps the most misunderstood war in the history of the United States. The 
Vietnam War left a determination among policy and military leaders not to repeat 
the mistakes made there, a phenomenon called the Vietnam Syndrome. U.S. leaders 
now abandoned the Munich analogy for that of Vietnam. 
During the Vietnam War yearsf nearly 9f000f000 Americans served in the four 
branches of the United States forces. This makes the Vietnam War second in 
number of personnel involved in one war (only World War TI saw more American 
soldiers involved). Over 300,000 soldiers were wounded, 150/000 of those were 
classified as seriously wounded and nearly 60/000 lost their lives.70 
69 Holyoak and Thagard, Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought, p. 160. 
70 John S. Bowman, ed., The Vietnam War: An Almanac, New York: World Almanac 
Publications, 1985, p. 385. 
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The Vietnam War effectively ended on January 11, 1973. American 
participation ended by negotiation and with a Peace Agreement signed by the 
United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Army of the Republic of 
-
South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government on January 27, 1973, 
in Paris. But, the war stayed in American minds long ·after the guns fell silent 
Today, the mere sound of the word Vietnam brings to one's mind a meaningless 
miserable war, not a country in Southeast Asia. 
C. THEIMPACIOFTHEVIETNAMWAR 
Besides being a great inspiration for books, movies, television shows and art, 
this war had a major influence on American political culture. The ''Vietnam 
Syndrome" rapidly became a spiritual disease of all post-war administrations. 
This war influenced the people, the military, and the government at the 
same time. Even, a century and a half earlier, Carl von Clausewitz stated that 
these three factors are the essential basis for military operations: 
War is, therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because 
it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case, but 
it is also ... a wonderful trinity ... The first of these three phases 
concerns more the people; the second, more the General and his 
Army; the third, more the Government...A theory which would 
leave any one of them out of account, or set up any arbitrary 
relation between them, would immediately become involved in 
such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded 
as destroyed at once by that alone.71 
71 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, New York: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 121. 
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D. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
In a democracy such as America, public support is an essential 
precondition for the conduct of military operations. Most military engagements 
occur quickly with little preparation of public opinion. But prolonged 
engagement of military forces must be the outcome of the national will and must 
be supported by a majority of the American people and their elected 
representatives in the Congress. 
The term "Vietnam Syndrome" refers in general to the lingering effects of 
Vietnam on the U.S. national conscience and specifically to the American 
public's reluctance to support military actions abroad. During the Sixth century 
B.C., a mysterious Chinese warrior-philosopher, Sun Tzu, said that moral 
influence, that which causes people to be in harmony with their leaders, is 
essential to victory in war.72 In Vietnam, public confidence in the military 
eroded due to an inept strategy of attrition, dishonest assessments, and unjust 
conscription. 
The United States had never lost a war in its history. Americans did not 
lose one single battle in the Vietnam War, and although its military power 
remained potent, its military authority declined painfully. 
After its victories in World War II, the United States military enjoyed a 
reputation as the best army in the world. The Korean War constituted a sign of 
American weakness and eroded the U.S. reputation for invincibility. Vietnam 
72 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Boston: Shambhala, 1988, p. 43. 
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caused a loss of confidence in the ability of the United States military to win 
every war. Once United States troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam, the 
nation breathed a collective sight of relief and adopted a unever again'' school of 
thought on the use of American troops to defend non-Communist regimes and 
to control political changes in Third World countries. 
The Vietnam War was a reaffirmation of the exceptional relationship 
between the American national will and the American Army. The American 
Army really belongs to the American people, who take a proprietary interest in 
its involvement If the American people lose their commitment, it is delusive to 
try to keep the Army committed. General Fred C. Weyand, who was the last 
commander of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam and supervised the 
withdrawal of U.S. military forces in 1973, stated: 
In the final analysis, the American Army is not so much an arm of 
the Executive Branch as it is an arm of the American people. The 
Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly.73 
The Gulf War of 1991, rebuilt a bridge between the military and the 
American people. President Bush developed public and Congressional support 
for his Persian Gulf policy. He used every opportunity to address the nation 
and to explain America's objectives in the Gulf.74 This was never the case during 
the Vietnam War. In the Gulf War, Bush ensured that the American people 
73 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, New York: Dell 
Books, 1982, p. 33. 
74 For example, see the statement by President Bush, January 16, 1991: "Our objectives are clear. 
Sad dam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be 
restored to its rightful place and Kuwait once again will be free. Iraq will eventually comply 
with all relevant United Nations resolutions ... " Harry G. Summers, Jr., A Critical Analysis of 
the Gulf War, p. 162. 
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supported the war and the American military reached the level of authority 
they had possessed before.75 
E. THE MILITARY 
When President Richard Nixon took office in January 1969 a 
Pentagon computer was fed all the data on the United States 
and North Vietnam-size of population, gross national product, 
steel production, numbers of ships, tanks, aircraft, and the rest. 
It was then asked, uwhen will we win?" The answer was 
instantaneous: uYou won in 1964!"76 
The ghost of the Vietnam Syndrome also bequeathed to the military itself 
a wound that still seems fresh. This war had been a painful lesson for every 
aspect of the United States military doctrine. For eight years the American 
military fought bravely and well on the land, in the air, at the sea. As the 
University of California at Berkeley's Professor Douglas Pike noted: "It was a 
record unparalleled in the history of modern warfare." Yet after eight years, the 
army completed the withdrawal of its forces without having defeated the 
enemy. It was not evident in 1973 that the U.S. army had lost its first war; it only 
become clear in 1975, when the South Vietnamese army, which had been trained 
and equipped for more than two decades, was overrun in a blitz operation by 
the North Vietnamese Communists. 
Although the United States military was well trained and better 
equipped then their enemy, the army was ill-prepared, both doctrinally and in 
75 Ibid., p. 19. The day after the Gulf war began, 83 percent of Americans supported the war. 
At war's end, a Washington Post-ABC poll gave President Bush a 90 percent approval rating. 
76 Ibid. 1 P• 56. 
34 
terms of its force structure, for guerrilla warfare. They oriented their doctrinal 
development, force structure, and field training toward a high-intensity, nuclear 
and conventional war. Little theoretical thought was given to develop a doctrine 
of the fundamental differences between conventional and unconventional 
conflict. At the same time, the North Vietnamese Communists had proven 
themselves experts of a form of unconventional war which they called the 
People's War. Recognizing their inferiority in conventional military power, the 
North Vietnamese, through the People's War, fought the guerrilla war.77 In 
Vietnam, the failure of the U.S. was at the strategic level. 
Americans waged the wrong method of war and, what is more 
significant, fundamental decisions on Vietnam were being made in Washington. 
Military leaders allowed civilian °Strategists" to run the war and to dictate to the 
military professionals the strategies for the conduct of war. The opposite was 
true in the successful Gulf War, where it was made quite clear by President Bush 
that he had no intention of micro-managing tactical or even operationally 
strategic actions.78 This is a stark contrast to the classic image of President 
Johnson poring over maps of North Vietnam, selecting each of the targets to be 
hit. But, without any doubt, the Gulf War was fought in the shadow of the 
77 The People's War strategy has three phases. In the first phase, the insurgents build their 
political infrastructure, recruit membership, and conduct selected terrorist acts against regime. 
The second phase continues all operations initiated in the first phase and is characterized by 
guerrilla operations against political, economic, and military targets. Phase three occurs when 
the military balance is better than in the two earlier phases. In this phase the insurgent 
operations are combined with the operations conducted in the earlier two phases and large 
formations attack in conventional or quasi-conventional meaning. 
78 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War, New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1995, preface. 
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Vietnam War. The victory in the Persian Gulf War has been traced as a 
vindication of the U.S. military efforts to reform itself following Vietnam. 
Unlike Vietnam, there would be no gradual escalation to give the enemy a 
chance to recover. The Gulf War was a unique situation and an opportunity to 
apply the doctrine of warfare developed to counter and defeat the enemy on the 
European continent. Equally important is that 
.. .it was a test of Powell's doctrine of decisive force, of joint 
warfare, and of Congress's attempt to reform and reorganize the 
military to avoid the pitfalls of the Vietnam War. Once the 
political objectives were set, this had been the generals' war to win 
or lose.79 
However, the Persian Gulf War was an impressive demonstration of American 
military power but it was an incomplete success. With the emphasis on a quick 
victory and speedy exit, the generals supported the premature decision to bring 
the war to a close. They resisted providing any measure of protection for the 
Kurds and Shiites who had been encouraged to battle Saddam Hussein. An 
implicit goal of the military campaign 
... was contradicted by the impulse to quickly withdraw, disengage, 
and avoid any military links to the insurgents. The disconnect 
between the military and political aims resulted in a confusing 
end.80 
And, yet Saddam Hussein is still there. 
In many ways, the United States army has recovered from the Vietnam 
War. Today's soldiers are better equipped and better prepared to fight than the 
79 Ibid, p. x. (emphasis added) 
so Ibid, P· XV. 
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Vietnam generation was. They are better able to perform the mission as was 
clearly confirmed during the Persian Gulf War. The fact is that insurgency wars 
are the prevalent form of conflict in the Third World. Given the growing focus 
on the Third World as a source of markets and raw materials/ it would seem 
proper for the American army to study revolutionary war/ train for it/ and 
allocate significant resources for it. 
Ironically/ a doctrinal vacuum was a characteristic for the period after the 
Vietnam War. Harry Summers/ 1982 study On Strategy had a big influence on 
the development of the United States military thought as well as on the 
formulation of the Weinberger Doctrine. A retired Lieutenant Colonet 
Summers, served as a battalion and corps operations officer during the Vietnam 
War. He was sent to the Army War College to compile the various lessons of the 
Vietnam War and draw some conclusions.81 Summers/ interpretation of Vietnam 
soon became the Army's official view and his book gained wide support in the 
military and academic communities. Unpolished and not quite developed for 
civilian policy-makers' consumption/ Summers/ lessons needed a powerful 
promoter before it could be fully transformed from its original simple analysis to 
an official policy. Many of Summers/ lessons of the Vietnam War find their way 
for the official use through "Weinbergers six tests." In a November 28/ 1984 
speech to the National Press Club, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger 
81 Stephen J. Mariano, Peacekeepers Attend the Never Again School. Monterey, CA: Master's 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December, 1995, p. 49. 
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identified a series of major conditions to be applied when weighing the use of 
the United States combat forces abroad. Weinberger stated: 
.. .I proposed six "tests" governing my definition of a situation 
requiring us to commit our forces to "combat" Those six tests, 
in brief are: 
1. Our vital interests must be at stake. 
2. The issues involved are so important for the future of the 
United States and our allies that we are prepared to commit 
enough forces to win. 
3. We have clearly defined political and military objectives, which 
we must secure. 
4. We have sized our forces to achieve our objectives. 
5. We have some reasonable assurance of the support of the 
American people. 
6. U.S. forces are committed to combat only as a last resort.82 
In this approach, Weinberger presents the win criteria. By not allowing the 
military to use overwhelming force in Vietnam, the American government 
prevented their forces from winning: this was seen as stab-in-the-back. This new 
approach allowed military to use overwhelming strength as a guarantee to win 
every war. 
From the military's point of view, the Weinberger doctrine was meant to 
guarantee that the U.S. would not repeat the strategic mistakes of the Vietnam 
War. In Vietnam, there was no clear intention of winning despite the sacrifices 
being made; there was tenuous public and congressional support, and the 
military and political objectives were never clearly defined. The Vietnam 
Syndrome was, in essence, the understandable desire on the part of America's 
sz Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: 
Warner Communications Company, 1990, p. 402. 
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military that their sacrifices not be in vain. As the post-Vietnam military sought 
to rebuild the strategic ethos, one officer wrote that 
... when it comes to being engaged in any undertaking where 
political objectives are hazy, public support only tepid, the 
prospects for a rapid decision remote, and the risk of substantial 
casualties high, service opinion is unanimous: count us Qut.83 
The problem is that this is precisely the kind of mission the U.S. military is likely 
to face after the end of the Cold War. 
It therefore came as no surprise when General Colin Powell, who had 
been a young infantry officer in Vietnam, fortified the Weinberger doctrine 
while serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Powell weighed in with 
even more explicit guidance as to how military force should be used in 
interventions. 84 In particular, he wished to reinvigorate the strategic link: closely 
matching military goals to political objectives, as is well known, he favored 
using overwhelming force to guarantee that objectives would be reached at 
minimum cost in American lives. This was very much the philosophy in the 
Gulf War, where Powell stated that his strategy left nothing to chance, and that 
the U.S. military was "not operating in the margin" and would "win 
decisively."85 In fact he opposed the war. 
It was Powell who had argued within the Bush administration and, 
surprisingly, outside administration councils with allied officials, 
against even going to war to liberate Kuwait...Powell' s concern was 
83 A. J. Bacevich, "Military Culture and Institutional Change in Peace Operations,"- An American 
Strategy, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995, p. 105. 
84 Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No 5, Winter 1992-
1993, pp. 32-45. 
85 Lawrence Freeman and Efraim Kharsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, London: Faber & Faber, 
1993, p. 207. 
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that the liberation of Kuwait, noble goal that it was, might not 
produce the speedy and decisive victory his doctrine required.86 
During the Yugoslav war, General Powell did not change his position, and with 
the statement that "we have learned the proper lessons of history,"87 he showed 
his reluctance to use force. 
Such behavior on the part of senior leadership, such as Colin Powell and 
Norman Schwarzkopf, certainly can be explained with the fact that today's 
commanders were junior officers in Vietnam. More than two decades later they 
would be the senior officers who led American forces to victory in the Persian 
Gulf. In the Persian Gulf War, U.S. military strategists were determined to avoid 
another Vietnam "quagmire." They were preparing for the last war instead of 
the next. After the Gulf War the commander of U.S. forces, General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, exclaimed: 
I measure everything in my life from Vietnam.88 
F. THE GOVERNMENT 
All the post-Vietnam war administrations have been psychologically 
influenced by the Vietnam War and Vietnam kept reappearing in the American 
political debate. The Vietnam Syndrome had institutional and subjective 
manifestations. Institutionally, it assumed a number of specific issues: the War 
Powers Resolution, the Weinberger Doctrine, restrictions on the operations by 
86 Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Stoi:y of the Conflict in the Gulf, p. ix. 
87 Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," The New York Times, October 8, 1992, p. A21. 
88 Kutler, Stanley 1., ed, Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1996, p. 557. 
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the CIA and other intelligence agencies, and the reduction of the Pentagon 
budget. Congress, following the Vietnam War and further involvement in other 
countries' conflicts, felt it needed more control over the Executive Branch and 
the power of the President in actions other than a Declared War. The 1973 War 
Powers Act prohibits the President from waging war beyond 60 days without 
Congressional approval.89 Authorization can be made in many forms, such as a 
temporary waiver of the Act or via a Declaration of War. This Act was intended 
to reassert democratic control over the decision to send U.S. troops on dangerous 
missions around the world. To this point, Alexander Hamilton had written: 
"The Legislature can alone declare war, can alone actually transfer the nation 
from a state of Peace to a state of War."9o 
More serious than these institutional reverses, was the subjective 
response. "We need a policy to prevent more Vietnams," Richard Nixon said 
when accepting his 1968 nomination for the President. "No more Vietnams" 
became the closest statement that the Americans had to a national consensus. 
President Jimmy Carter, who was elected when the Vietnam Syndrome was at 
its peak, generally led the non-interventionist policy. This policy prevented 
direct U.S. involvement in such conflicts as the Zaire in 1976, the Iranian 
Revolution and the Nicaraguan civil war. Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus 
89 The War Powers Resolution, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. Public 
Law 93-148, 93rd Congress, H.J. Res. 542, November 7, 1973. It was Joint Resolution concerning 
the war powers of Congress and the President, resolved by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. 
90 Morton J. Frisch, ed., Selected Writings and Speeches of Alexander Hamilton, Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute, 1985, p. 403. 
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Vance, is the best example of the Vietnam Syndrome in power. When the U.S. 
forces invaded the Iranian desert in an attempt to rescue the United States 
diplomats who were taken hostages, Vance resigned because of the principle he 
could not serve a president who would use force. Summarizing the Vietnam 
period, in 1975 Senator Edward Kennedy declared that "the lesson of Vietnam is 
that we must throw off the cumbersome mantle of world policeman," and 
Senator Alan Cranston observed that "the United States should be a peaceful 
world neighbor instead of a militant world meddler."91 This view 
predominated, and in 1976 Congress voted against U.S. military involvement in 
Angola and in the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict. 
The country's disagreement over Vietnam still marked American political 
life a generation later. During the 1980, 1984, and 1988 presidential campaigns 
and administrations, Vietnam kept bubbling up. Ronald Reagan viewed the 
Vietnam War as a "noble cause" that failed because politicians in Washington 
did not let the military do its job. In his presidential campaign he wanted to 
revive American pride and self-confidence which he felt was lost in the Vietnam 
War. In foreign policy, the new President promised to stand with friends and to 
confront enemies. As America's economic and military strength returned, this 
nation would again be respected around the world. He argued that first was the 
need to overcome the so-called Vietnam syndrome, which symbolized 
defeatism, malaise, and a near isolationist foreign policy. While American 
91 Michael T. Klare, Beyond the "Vietnam Syndrome": U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s, 
Washington: The Institute for Pohcy Studies, 1981, p. 3. 
42 
policy stood paralyzed, communism was on the march. The record of 
communist advances after the Vietnam War, during the Ford-Carter years was 
significant. In 1975, South Vietnam and Laos were conquered by North 
Vietnam. Angola and Mozambique became Soviet-Cuban puppet states, as did 
Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1978. In 1979, Cambodia was conquered by North 
Vietnam, and Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviet army. In this same year, 
Grenada and Nicaragua became Soviet influenced states. This advance of 
communism ended in 1980, when Suriname established a Marxist dictatorship. 
For generations, the United States had been the champion of the status quo, 
protecting existing governments from subversion or overthrow. Suddenly, for 
the first time in recent history, American national leaders were talking of making 
public moral judgments about the nature of the governments they will support 
and oppose. 
Reagan told a veterans' audience that: 
.. .It is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble 
cause ... We 
will never again ask young men to fight and possibly die in a war 
our government is afraid to win. 92 
He blamed the government for the war's failure and opposed normalizing 
relations with Vietnam. 
Vietnam as metaphor become visible during the Kuwait crisis of 1990-
1991. Vice President Quayle proclaimed: "Operation Desert Storm will not be 
92 Quoted in Howell Raines, "Reagan Calls Arms Race Essential to A void a 'Surrender' or 
'Defeat,"' New York Times. August 19,1980, pp. Al, 017. 
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another Vietnam ... They will not be asked to fight with one arm tied behind their 
back."93 Prior to the Gulf War, President George Bush had to struggle with the 
Vietnam Syndrome while building public support for the United States military 
involvement. Bush succeeded in getting far-reaching public approval for U.S. 
intervention in the Middle East and was able to maintain that support 
throughout the brief war. Bush claimed that the Persian Gulf War victory laid to 
rest the ghost of Vietnam, the fear of military entanglement inspired in U.S. 
policymakers and the public. 
It's a proud day for Americans and by God, we've licked the 
Vietnam Syndrome once and for all.94 
Was President Bush right? I have tried to show that the Gulf War was deeply 
shaped by Vietnam. The Vietnam Syndrome continued to divide American 
opinion: There was quite some irony in Bush's proclamation of the death of the 
syndrome. He left Hussein in and allowed him to rebuild his chemical and arms 
complex. He hesitated to help the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites. He did not require 
more vigorous enforcement of U.N. resolutions that Iraq violated at every 
opportunity, and when the U.N. Security Council decided that a military 
response was required he took the form of graduated response. 95 
Despite repeated threats of broad retaliation by Washington, the 
air strike against Iraq today was a minimal military action, 
intended not to produce a decisive military outcome but to send 
the political signal that Washington and its allies were determined 
93 Quoted in Maureen Dowd, "Quayle Aims at Protests, ala Agnew," New York Times, January 
24, 1991, p. A13. 
94 President George W. Bush, March 1, 1991, quoted in Ann Devroy and Guy Gugliotta, "Bush to 
'Move Fast' on Mideast Peace," The Washington Post. March 2,1991, p. A13. 
95ltalicized by M.Burdelez 
44 
to enforce the restrictions imposed on Baghdad at the end of the 
Gulf War. The raid ... had more in common with the philosophy of 
gradual escalation in the Vietnam war than the day-and-night blitz 
of the Gulf War ... As in Vietnam, the United States struck, ordered a 
pause in the bombing to evaluate the response, and suggested it 
would expand the attack if Baghdad did not get the message.96 
If this is not the Vietnam Syndrome, then it has never existed .. 
The Kuwait War has devalued the specter of Vietnam, but it did not 
destroy it. This ghost reappeared with each successive proposal to use military 
force-to end starvation in Somalia, to restore an elected president in Haiti, to 
stop Serb atrocities in former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was the foreign policy 
issue over which presidential candidate Clinton had criticized President Bush 
most sharply. Clinton promised more aggressive action in the former 
Yugoslavia, but his Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, 
once more was against intervention. Powell's views on Bosnia had not shifted 
from the Bush's administration and he laid out the same military conceptions. In 
his book, My American Journey, he compared the Yugoslav and Vietnam wars: 
The harsh reality has been that the Serbs, Muslims, and Croatians 
are committed to fight to the death for what they believe to be their 
vital interest. They have matched their military actions to their 
political objectives, just as the North Vietnamese did years earlier. 
The West has wrung its hands over Bosnia, but has not been able to 
find its vital interests or matching commitment. No American 
President could defend to the American people the heavy sacrifice 
of lives it would cost to resolve this baffling conflict. Nor could a 
President likely sustain the long-term involvement necessary to 
keep the protagonists from going at each other's throats all over 
again at the first opportunity.97 
96 See Michael Gordon, "Hitting Hussein With a Stick, With a Sledgehammer in Reserve," New 
York Times, January 14, 1993. 
97 Colin L Powell, My American Journey, New York: Random House, 1995, pp. 577-8. 
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The Serbians took from the Gulf War the lesson of the need to avoid war 
with the United States and other major industrial powers. 
Serb propaganda made great play with 1history' and the Vietnam 
parallel. Milosevic and his henchmen saw very clearly that victory 
in the Gulf War had not lifted the shadow of South-East Asian 
defeat from the shoulders of the American Gulliver. Far_ from it. H 
anything the miraculously bloodless victory over Saddam 
reinforced the trauma ... Their laurels were won cheaply and they 
feared tarnishing them by risking their good fortune again so soon 
after liberating Kuwait.98 
The Serbian camp has been careful that its actions remain below the 
threshold of provoking unacceptable international pressure, particularly an 
armed intervention, based in part on its assessment of the Gulf War experience. 
Belgrade assumed that the threshold for intervention was much higher in the 
case of Yugoslavia than was true in the Gult given the lack of overriding 
political or material interests (e.g., oil) in the Balkans. At those points in the 
crisis when international military action seemed more likely, for example 
September 1991 or Spring 1992, the Serbian camp made apparent concessions to 
the international community, however tactical in character. This tactic was 
seeking to seize or regain the initiative by striking at U.S. and coalition centers of 
political gravity. These centers of gravity are the political system and public 
opinion of the United States, which are arguably sensitive to casualties, the 
length of the conflict, and civilian damage. Those who recall General 
Schwarzkopf s angry reaction against ubody count'' during the Persian Gulf War 
will find echoes over twenty years earlier. 
98 Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 254. (emphasis added) 
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One of the most violent reactions we got was from the body count, 
particularly from the young combat arms officers recently back 
from Vietnam.99 
The American people had no tolerance for foreign operations, humanitarian or 
otherwise, if it meant that their sons and daughters might be brutalized or killed. 
The zero-tolerance for the casualties and the obsession with it on the part of the 
Congress and the media was evident in every American action. In December 
1992, U.S. military forces entered Somalia as part of a U.N. forces to deliver food 
and medicine to desperately hungry people. The operation enjoyed the 
overwhelming support of the American public. But one year later, on October 5, 
1993, a drastically different set of images came to the TV screens--bodies of 
American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by smiling 
Somalis. Senators and Representatives said the American people wanted out. 
Within 48 hours of the news reports of the deaths, the president 
addressed the nation: the United States would leave Somalia 
within six months. Clearly, the announcement was a direct 
response to the notion that the American people were fed up.1oo 
The American public is very sensitive to the loss of American lives abroad. The 
U.S. policy-makers need to worry not only about public support for beginning of 
a foreign operation, but about the response to American casualties. In that case, 
it is widely assumed that the American public would strongly demand the 
withdrawal of the U.S. troops. 
99 Harry G. Summers, Jr., A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, p. 55. 
lOO Steven Kull, "Misreading the Public Mood," The Bulletin of the Atomic Sdentists, 
March/ April, 1995, p. 56. 
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These manifestations of the so-called Vietnam syndrome were not 
dispelled by the success in the Gulf War. Furthermore, U.S. tolerance for the 
apparent costs of war may have actually declined because of the exceedingly 
high standards that were set by Operation Desert Storm. 
Serbian military analysts learned that lesson and before the YP A 
intensified the war in Croatia, the military leadership in Belgrade began 
studying the prospects of the U.S. becoming militarily involved. A part of the 
analysis was published in the Serbian military journal Vojno Delo.101 In the 
introduction, Colonel Jovan Canak and other analysts specifically compared the 
Yugoslav Conflict and the Gulf War. They tried to forecast how to make war in 
Yugoslavia while avoiding war with the U.S. The YPA leadership drew two 
conclusions. First, they concluded that the European Community could not 
engage its military forces without U.S. support, which, because the United States 
was not significantly involved, was lacking. Second, they assumed that the 
division in the international community would not reach consensus for military 
intervention as it was the case in the Gulf War. 
One of its primary tactics in this respect was the invocation of the 
specter of Vietnam, in an attempt to play on the sensibilities of 
Western political and military elites.1o2 
Serbian officials and media made good use of this and have suggested 
that any international intervention force would become bogged down in 
1o1 James Gow, "One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, 
No. 23, June 4,1993, p. 5. 
102 Ibid, p. 6. 
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guerrilla warfare. Indeed, Milan Panic, the U.S. businessman who in July 1992 
became premier of Yugoslavia, which consisted only of Serbia and Montenegro, 
told the Associated Press that Western intervention could lead to a second 
Vietnam.103 Panic said in an interview: 
We are a sovereign country. H attacked, we would have to defend 
ourselves. But, I hope that the Americans would not do it 104 
The Serbians encouraged the belief that an international intervention force 
would not only be bogged down militarily but would be caught in an 
incomprehensible political maelstrom. They attempted to disguise Belgrade's 
military role and create the impression of a chaotic, uncontrollable ethnic war. 
Among the most zealous Balkanists were the Serb nationalists, who 
asserted that the Bosnian conflict was part of an age-old pattern of 
ethnic war, that outsiders could not understand it and should leave 
the people of Bosnia to solve it for themselves (while keeping in 
place the arms embargo )_lOS 
Serbia's political strategy has required more effective use of the media 
than Sad dam Hussein exercised in Kuwait The Serbian military's studies of the 
Gulf War pointed to the importance of developing good relations with a pool of 
suitably "informed" journalists. The leader of the Serbs in Bosnia, Radovan 
Karadzic, accordingly tried to size the media initiative, giving frequent press 
briefings and interviews, sending letters to the Times in London, as well as 
allowing reporters access to the military units ostensibly under his control.106 
103 Thorn Shanker, "Wider Balkan War Feared," Chicago Tribune, August 11, 1992, p. 1. 
104 Ibid. 
1os Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 127. 
106 The U.N. Commision of Experts examined human rights violations in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia from November 1992 until April1994, and found that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan 
Karadzic was directly linked to the practice. They find him guilty of grave breaches of the 1949 
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Karadzic' s key message for the Western press played up the image of a 
maelstrom of ethnic hostilities. The message was clear: international military 
intervention would be another Vietnam, not another Desert Storm. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter was to explore the rise of the Vietnam 
Syndrome. One can see that the memories of U.S. paralysis and despair in 
Vietnam remain potent. So long as these memories remain alive, and the public 
remains skeptical about official explanations for government conduct, the 
Vietnam Syndrome will continue to discourage military intervention abroad. 
Geneva Convention, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity. 
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III. THE BALKAN QUAGMIRE MYTH: HOW THE SERBS FOUGHT THE 
WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Opponents of military action in the Yugoslav war have variously declared 
the Serbs to be unbeatable, the terrain too mountainous to be vulnerable, and the 
Balkan conflict a Vietnam-like quagmire. According to these arguments, the 
high-tech American and European armies are powerless, it seems, when 
confronted by a few thousand Serb killers with Kalashnikovs. 
A favorite argument supporting Serb invincibility is that Serb forces tied 
up 16 German divisions in World War II. On April 25, 1993, President Clinton 
proclaimed that 
Hitler sent tens of thousands of soldiers to that area and was never 
successful in subduing it.l07 
The truth is that the Germans destroyed the entire Yugoslav Army and occupied 
that country in a couple of weeks. 
The German invasion of Yugoslavia began on April 6, 1941, and 
Yugoslavia accepted unconditional surrender on April 17. The Germans 
captured more than 250,000 prisoners while sustaining only 558 casualties.1os 
107 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Rehgion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 126. 
10s Artur L. Clark, Bosnia: What Every American Should Know, New York: Berkley Books, 1996, 
p. 154. See also Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 133. Almond 
estimated only 166 German casualties. 
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Germany's decision to invade Yugoslavia was prompted by the failure of Italy's 
invasion of Albania and Greece and only task of the German forces was to guard 
and to secure the routes to Greece and Southern front. 
... Yet the Germans' strength in the Balkans was never sufficient to 
do more than keep open the main lines of communication ... The 
vast Yugoslav hinterland was never occupied at a1I ... 1o9 
Furthermore, the combat units that had so quickly accomplished the invasion of 
Yugoslavia, were withdrawn for use in the invasion of the Soviet Union. The 
Germans used as replacements mostly older men and those soldiers who had 
been wounded on other fronts. They were sent here for recovery and rest. 
... the number of Germans involved with the Partisans was 
negligible and indeed the desperate shortage of German 
manpower was a grievance of which local commanders constantly 
complained. On 24 September, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the German forces visited Hitler to protest that he was expected to 
hold down a front of 5,000 kilometers with ten poor-quality 
divisions ... 110 
German attempts to compensate for manpower shortages by relying on the 
forces of its allies were of little avail. These forces would engage the Partisans 
only after German units had broken the principal enemy resistance. It has to be 
stated that not until the end of the Second World War, after the allies massive 
aid and air support, did Tito' s partisans became a viable force. The final 
decision of the German High Command to withdraw its armies from the Balkans 
was imposed not by the Partisans but by mounting pressure from the Eastern 
109 Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the West since 1939, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985, p. 94. 
110 Ibid, p. 95. 
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and Western fronts. After World War IT, it was Tito who created the legend of 
the partisan resistance and it became part of the Communist creed, compulsorily 
dinned into the heads of all Yugoslav children from the age of five, that 
Yugoslavia, unlike all the rest of Europe, freed itself from Axis occupation by 
virtue of its own resistance. 
The second part of the truth is that, contrary to the perception in the West, 
it was not only the Serbs who fought the Germans in the World War II. 
As we have seen, the Serbs of Serbia had played a minor role in 
Partisan fighting ... 111 
No effort was made to distinguish between the anti-Nazi fighters of World War 
IT, who were a multiethnic and multireligious group, and the Serb militias of 
today.112 The fact is that the other Yugoslav nationalities made up a large 
percentage of the anti-fascist resistance movement and fought in their own 
partisan units. For example, five out of a total ofeleven Yugoslav Partisan Army 
Corps in the 1944 were Croatian.u3 
B. SIEGE OF VUKOV AR AND DUBROVNIK 
People who argued that U.S. forces might find themselves in the endless 
involvement in a war and in a extended combat with a "formidable" Yugoslav 
Army, must have missed the battles of Vukovar and Dubrovnik in 1991. During 
the siege of Vukovar, fewer than 1,500 unorganized, inexperienced Croatians, 
111 Ibid, p. 190. 
m Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 125. 
113 Enciklopedija Tugoslavije, Zagreb: Jugoslavenski Leksikografski Zavod, 1967. 
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equipped with only infantry arms, held off for three months 25,000 Yugoslav 
troops backed by heavy artillery, hundreds of tanks and MIGs, for three months, 
until the Croats' ammunition ran out. 
The second example is the case of Dubrovnik, where no more than 700 
lightly-armed Croatians and 40,000 citizens, including women and children, 
endured a ten month siege by the Serbs. The operations started on October 1, 
1991, in the Konavle region, the narrow strip of land behind Dubrovnik. Having 
seized control of the Konavle region, the YP A began to besiege the old Adriatic 
town from land and sea. Ground forces and naval vessels destroyed one house 
after another, grossly neglecting the blue U.N. flags which were posted all over 
Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik citizens braved and survived heavy shelling from the 
Yugoslav army, navy, and air-force, and stopped their intention to occupy the 
city. Indeed, the Serbs do their best fighting against unarmed women and the 
elderly. 
The role of Serbian heavy artillery and tanks was essentially harassment. 
The artillery was fired in an indiscriminate way, as a weapon of terror. It was 
not applied as a military support mechanism to sustain operations. It was used 
for psychological purposes mainly against civilians in unprotected towns and 
villages. After heavy shelling by regular troops of the YP A, militia leaders such 
as Vojislav Seselj and Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan, with their paramilitary units, 
carried out ethnic cleansing and spread terror throughout Croatian and Bosnian 
territory. 
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Militia leaders worked to instill an ethos of brutality. Arkan, the 
leader of the Tiger militia, used his headquarters in the city of 
Erdut as a training ground. Serb recruits were taught that in 
fighting the enemy, they had no right to spare children, ·women, or 
the aged. Serb military commanders showed reporters and their 
own troops how to slit a throat by having pigs killed as 
demonstrations.n4 
Despite the obvious aggression on the part of the Yugoslav army against 
cultural and civilian targets in Croatia, the international community still 




Serb forces are structured on the same Soviet model used by Iraqi forces. 
Both the Iraqis and the Serbs, are heavily dependent on tanks and artillery and 
do not have much courage for going toe-to-toe with armed adversaries. In many 
ways, air power could be more effective against the Serbs than it was against the 
Iraqis or the Vietnamese. First of all, the Iraqis had an entire desert and the 
Vietnamese had a whole jungle in which to hide tanks and artillery, whereas the 
Serb heavy weapons and tanks were limited to flat areas near roads in the rocky 
and mountainous terrain. Secondly, in wintertime Yugoslavia, unlike the Iraqi 
desert or Vietnamese jungle, numerous fires in troop areas and lots of running 
tank engines generated heat signatures for air-to-ground missiles. Finally, since 
114 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 75. 
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the Serbs have demonstrated no taste for equal combat, it was unlikely that the 
combat would continue. A Marine artillery captain, Scott Buren, who traveled 
across Bosnia and saw a number of Serb units and positions, concluded that the 
Serbs were using the same tactics that were used to fight the American Civil 
War. Buren said: 
.. .it would be a simple matter for U.S. Marines to handle the Serbs 
by air or on the ground.115 
To support this statement, it is necessary to mention the last two 
operations of the Croatian Army. As Croatia succeeded to equip its military 
forces and to reach an equal potential to the Serbs, they showed the Serbs' real 
inability to fight a war. In the early morning hours of May 1, 1995, special 
Croatian police and government troops initiated "Operation Flash," an attack to 
liberate occupied Western Slavonia. Government forces gained effective control 
of most of the area within one day, and a cease-fire was reached on the afternoon 
of May 3. On August 4, 1995, government forces launched the larger scale 
"Operation Storm" on the former sectors north and south, and gained effective 
control of the area within five days. Rebel Serb forces organized a weak 
counteroffensive and quickly prepared an evacuation of both military and 
civilian personnel from the area. These two actions in which Croatian forces 
liberated one third of the country showed the limited ability and ~'~'heroism" of 
the Serb soldier. 
ns J. P. Mackley, "The Balkan Quagmire Myth: Taking on the Serbs Would Be More Grenada 
than Vietnam," The Washington Post, March 7,1993, p. C3. 
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2. Equipment 
All of the equipment in use by the Serbs was antiquated by any but Third 
World standards. The Serbs were using low-tech T -33 and T -55 tanks, and their 
mortars and artillery pieces lacked any kind of sophisticated fire control 
systems. Their antiaircraft capability was largely artillery of the type the North 
Vietnamese used 20 years ago. The Serbs had some MIG-29s, but they were 
flying lower-maintenance MIG-21s and MIG-23s. Yugoslav pilots simply did not 
fly the training hours they needed to stay prepared. A good example of their 
bombing inability was the bridge between Bosanski Brod, a town in Bosnia, and 
Slavonski Brod, the neighboring town in Croatia. Serb MIGs bombed that 150-
foot bridge daily for three months, hit it only six times, and failed to make it 
unusable. 
3. Logistics 
In Vietnam, supplies could come from anywhere across thousands of 
miles of borders. By contrast, all of the supplies, every liter of fuet each piece of 
munitions, and any food for the Serb troops, had to come across a half dozen 
bridges spanning either the Danube or the Drina rivers. If the movement of fuel 
and spare parts across those rivers were stopped, so would the ability of 
mechanized Serbia to wage war. 
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D. SUMMARY 
Although the war in the former Yugoslavia was by no means predictable, 
it bore no resemblance to the Vietnam analogy. The West failed to adopt a 
policy to deter military aggression. Early response also would have decreased 
the need to use force. Yugoslavia was an obvious example. The cases should be 
studied now by the van den Broecks, Bushes, Powells, Vances, Owens, and 
Stoltenbergs of the future, not after the shooting and the massacres have started. 
The West not only failed to send a clear warning to Serbia but indirectly 
even encouraged the use of military force. Croatian writer, Branka Magas, 
stated this in December 1991, five months before the Bosnian war, and at the 
same time made a grim prediction of things to come: 
To take sides in this war is not merely to take the side of one 
republic-Croatia-which is the current victim of aggression, or of 
Kosovo and Slovenia the past victims and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
which stands next in line.n6 
Yet President Lyndon Johnson, who was strongly affected by the events of 
World War R said that a the appetite of aggression is never satisfied."l17 He 
expressed the logic behind the Munich analogy as, 
If you let a bully come into your front yard one day, the next day 
he'll be on your porch, and the day after that he'll rape your wife 
in your own bed. us 
116 Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London: Verso, 1993, p. 359. 
117 Stanley I. Kutler, ed., Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1996, p. 341. 
118 Ibid, p. 342. 
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And indeed, the Serbs continued their aggression in April1992 by attacking the 
newly independent and recognized republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The West 
was less prepared than the Bosnians for the tragedy that was about to occur. As 
David Gompert, senior director of the Bush administration's_National Security 
staff, noted in 1994: 
... the Western powers failed utterly to prepare for the conflict in 
Bosnia they had every reason to expect .. Worse, the opportunity 
was lost to dispatch to Bosnia a peacekeeping force to discourage 
violence before it began.n9 
It should be noted that the international community did not fail to take measures 
that actually gave the attacking Serbs a crucial advantage. An arms embargo 
was imposed equally against the aggressor and the victims in September 1991, 
thus ensuring that the imbalance of power in favor of the better armed Serbs was 
maintained. At the request of the Belgrade authorities, the U.N. Security 
Council adopted Resolution 713 which imposed an arms embargo on all of the 
former republics. The embargo locked in Serbian military superiority over the 
other former Yugoslav republics. The Serbs had a virtual monopoly of heavy 
weapons having acquired nearly the entire military assets of the Yugoslav Army, 
including production facilities. 
Milosevic wanted U.N. 713 because a continuing monopoly of 
heavy guns and armor made it easier for his "federal" army to 
complete his program of ethnic cleansing.12o 
119 David Rieff, "The Lessons of Bosnia: Morality and Power," World Pohcy Journal, Spring 
1995, p. 19_ 
120 Albert Wohlstetter, "Why We're In It-Still," The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1993. 
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On December 18, 1992, the General Assembly voted by an overwhelming 
majority to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and asked the Security Council 
to immediately revoke Resolution 713.121 But, with the objections that lifting the 
arms embargo would increase violence, Britain, France, and Russia opposed the 
General Assembly's request. Addressing the Council, the Venezuelan 
Ambassador to the U.N. Security Councit Diego Arria, responded to the British, 
Russian, and French objections: 
We are told that lifting the arms embargo would increase violence. 
Already nearly two hundred thousand people have died. More 
than two million people have been displaced from their homes. 
Twenty thousand women have been raped. The International 
Court of Justice and the World Conference on Human Rights have 
indicated that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victim of genocide and 
"ethnic cleansing/' among other unspeakable crimes. For this 
Councit then, what precisely does it mean to say that violence 
would increase and spread? Han armed people posses a greater 
ability to defend themselves, this does not mean that violence 
would necessarily increase.122 
Everybody was ignoring the fact that the Bosnians had never asked for 
Western ground troops, only for a lifting of the arms embargo and for air 
support. The debate around intervention had become a way to distract attention 
from the real issue which was a lifting of the embargo. Bosnian President Alija 
Izetbegovic repeatedly urged Western leaders to either lift the arms embargo or 
intervene to stop the genocide. In his September 6, 1993 speech to the U.N. 
Security Council lzetbegovic pleaded: 
121 Rabia Ah and Lawrence Lifschultz, eds., Why Bosnia?: Writings on the Balkan War, p. xxviii. 
122 Ibid, xxix. 
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Defend us or allow us to defend ourselves. You have no right to 
deny us both.123 
By refusing to allow the Bosnians either to defend themselves or to use power to 
defend them, these leaders engaged in a form of passive violence, setting the 
parameters within which the killing could be and was _carried out with 
impunity. 
The course of the war in the former Yugoslavia has shown that whenever 
the defenders owned adequate means to withstand Serb attacks, much 
bloodshed was prevented. If the United States did not choose to send in ground 
troops, U.S. fighter pilots could still clear the air over Yugoslavia in less time 
than it took in Iraq and with far less trouble. But merely enforcing the "no-fly 
zone" over the Balkans would not have done much to influence the outcome of 
the war because Serb aircraft have not been a meaningful factor in the ground 
war. A better plan would have been to declare a "no-artillery zone" throughout 
Yugoslavia. A "no-artillery zone" ultimatum would quickly cool the hot war. 
Ninety percent of all casualties in the war were caused by Serb artillery, large, 
high visibility items and tank main guns, not short-range mortar tubes like the 
VietCong used in the jungle. Any heavy gun discovered firing by electronic 
surveillance could have been targeted from the air, no matter if it were Serb, 
Croatian, or Muslim. 
123 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genodde in Bosnia, p. 207. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. WHAT WAS THE QUESTION 
This thesis set out to answer a question to what extent the U.S. experience 
in Vietnam was the reason that U.S. decision makers used the Vietnam War as a 
historical analogy in order to not intervene in the Balkan conflict 
B. USING THE LESSONS OF THE PAST 
What experience and history teach is this-that people and 
governments never have learnt anything from history. 
Hegel124 
Before a nation considers employing its military forces abroad, the 
policymakers and their military leaders should evaluate the current conflict in 
light of historical experience. Although no two situations are exactly similar, 
history can teach us important lessons in determining which policies are likely to 
succeed and which are not. 
In selecting historical parallels to the current situation in the Balkans, the 
U.S. decision makers used the Vietnam War as historical analogy. But when 
comparing the Balkan conflict with the Vietnam War one can not ignore the 
following fundamental differences. While Vietnam was a strong dictatorial state 
created for decades, Yugoslavia was a disintegrating country with a vanishing 
124 Quoted in Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 340. 
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army. Before the war with the United States, desertion was not even possible in 
Vietnam. Vietnam's morale was high compared to Yugoslavia which had a 
disintegrating ideology, an army left without a country, little support for a war, 
and thousands of deserters. 
This thesis traces the evolution of the so-called Vietnam Syndrome and 
shows that the Vietnam Syndrome continues to affect the United States foreign 
policy. The prolonged indecisiveness regarding U.S. policy toward the war in 
former Yugoslavia is illustrative. The end of the Cold War has changed the 
context in which the United States considers international intervention, yet fears 
of another protracted involvement abroad with a gloomy objectives remains an 
underlying concern. 
The lessons of the Vietnam War learned from the American perspective 
were worthy of consideration. 
C. LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 
The principal lessons to be learned from American's experience in the 
Vietnam War include the following: 
1. The Americans underestimated their opponents in Vietnam. There 
was no invasion, only a slow infiltration. The people of that region 
had a long history of resisting foreign occupation. They were 
particularly adept at using the jungle terrain to make opponent's 
attempt to control the region both difficult and costly. 
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2. The Vietnam War presented a rival with two tough military problems: 
counterinsurgency and military operations in a jungle terrain. 
Furthermore, most of the soldiers were very young without combat 
experience and had little or no training in guerrilla warfare. American 
public support for the Vietnam conflict eroded throughout the war. 
U.S. attempts to compensate for manpower shortages by relying on the 
forces of its allies were of little avail, as these forces would engage the 
Vietnamese only after American units had broken the principal enemy 
resistance. American reliance on local collaborators was equally 
unsuccessful, as these units required extensive American supervision 
and were of limited combat value and questionable political 
reliability. 
3. Intervention in Vietnam did not express sanction from the United 
Nations. In the Vietnam War, with an exception of South Korea and 
Australia, the United States did not have active support from other 
countries. 
4. South Vietnam exemplified "governmental chaos." Having been at 
war for twenty years, the South Vietnamese had no such energy to 
fight for their nation. In contrast Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia had 
strong motivations for their withdrawal from Yugoslavia. 
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D. CHALLENGES THE U.S. FORCES WOULD HAVE ENCOUNTERED 
If the U.S. armed forces would have entered the Balkan conflict they 
would not have had the problems they had in the Vietnam War. First, unlike 
during the Vietnam War, they were invited into the country by the Croatian and 
Bosnian people who for the first time lived in newly independent countries and 
were willing to fight for their nations. This was a guarantee that support of the 
population would have been universal without any opposition. Second, the 
United States, with the exception of Great Britain, France, Greece, and Russia, 
had active support from other countries who wanted to stop these atrocities in 
the middle of Europe. Third, unlike South Vietnam, Croatia had a stable, 
democratically elected government. 
E. FOUR BIG MISTAKES 
Slovenians, Croats, and later Bosnians seemed to have been abandoned to 
their fate, victims of the indifference or worse of the world's most eminent 
statesmen. The Western public has been confused to from the beginning, and 
the mistakes have gotten bigger. Every one was an excuse for inaction. 
The first big mistake was that Yugoslavia must at all costs be preserved. 
Until the last minute, June 1991, the Western powers backed the moribund 
federal government. James Baker's last minute warning to the Croats and 
Slovenians not to break up was taken by the Serbs to mean that America and the 
European Community would not intervene. Western policy makers had a moral 
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and legal duty to uphold Article 51 of the U.N. Charter guaranteeing the right of 
a nation to defend itself, as well as the 1948 Geneva Convention requiring all 
signatory nations not only to prevent genocide but to punish it. The fictitious 
entity of Yugoslavia had become a tool of those Serb Communists, led by 
Slobodan Milosevic, who had staked their political survival on the creation of a 
Greater Serbia at the expense of the breakaway republics. 
After the real war against Croatia began in July, the next big delusion 
started to circulate in the European chancelleries. This was the claim that 
recognition of the republics' independence would antagonize the regime in 
Belgrade and bring down a frightful retribution on the mixed populations of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. European leaders were reluctant to grant the legal status 
of the Croatian government in Zagreb. They let the Serbs carry out ethnic 
cleansing in large areas of Croatia. 
As the horrors visited by the Serbs on the cities of Croatia multiplied, a 
third error emerged: international recognition need not entail military 
intervention. Germany increased pressure for recognition because no security 
arrangements to protect the defenseless had ever been contemplated. A United 
Nations arms embargo operated in favor of the better prepared aggressors. The 
strength of Croatian resistance during the sieges of Vukovar, Dubrovnik, and 
Osijek during autumn 1991 made the false notion that it would be enough to 
leave the new republics to look after themselves. 
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Having encouraged only one side in the conflict, the European 
Community found itself ignored. The stage was set for the fourth big mistake, 
one which is still believed. Drawing analogies with the Vietnam and guerrilla 
quagmire, world leaders and politicians argued that the war in Yugoslavia could 
not be influenced by military intervention. The surgical strikes used against Iraq 
would, it was suggested, be ineffective against the Serbs, who would also exact a 
terrible revenge against the non-Serbian Bosnians and Croats in their power. 
"Critical analysis," said Clausewitz, "is the application of theoretical truths to 
actual events."125 The theoretical truths of the Vietnam War were applied to the 
actual events of the former Yugoslavia and produced an explanation for failure 
of the political decision there. 
F. LESSONS FOR THE WORLD 
The international community has been taught a number of bitter lessons 
in the former Yugoslavia. The first one is that even if a massive intervention to 
impose a solution is out of the question, a threat of force used early on could 
have been useful to prevent the spread of hostilities and to bring the parties to 
the negotiation table. The possibility that force might be used strengthens the 
hand of diplomacy. Another lesson is that diplomatic recognition is a very 
blunt instrument. It promises little leverage over the newly recognized 
governments, but rather raises false hopes for outside support on their part. It 
125 Clausewitz, On War, p. 156. 
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must be conditioned on liberal regimes for minority rights and on uncontested 
border delineation, and it should be clearly distinguished from a pledge of 
military support. A third lesson points to the fact that if the United States and its 
European allies had sunk Serbian gunboats bombarding defenseless Dubrovnik 
during the summer of 1991, or acted more forcefully when Serbia invaded 
eastern Croatia, fighting might not have engulfed Bosnia. Had the air-strikes, or 
a credible threat of strikes, been used to prohibit any genocidal act earlier in the 
conflict, not only would untold hundred thousands of lives of all nationalities 
have been saved, but the lives of more than two hundred Western soldiers as 
well. Had they enforced sanctions approved by the United Nations Security 
Council, and not allowed them to be flouted, Belgrade would be paying a 
dearer economic price for its ethnic cleansing. Discontent might have grown in 
the Serbian capital, fostering an anti-war movement and, possibly altering the 
outcome of the elections. Perhaps the candidates of peace could have defeated 
Milosevic, the principal architect of war. 
The next important lesson is that the U.N. forces and leaders have to act 
with perfect impartiality with no views of their own. Was this the case with the 
forces which were employed in Yugoslavia?126 This is an impossible criterion. 
The first UNPROFOR commander, the Indian General Satish Nambiar, was 
126 The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was originally established under chapter 
VI of the U.N. Charter to implement the Geneva Agreement between the parties to the war in 
Croatia. See Richard H. Ullman, The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations Book, 1996, p. 198-211. 
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regularly accused by UNHCR officials in 1993 of holding pro-Serb views.127 
Susan Woodward, the American academic who did political analysis for 
Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Yugoslavia, 
was widely viewed even among her colleagues at UNPROFOR as being pro-
Serb.128 In April 1995, the U.N.'s chief negotiator, Thorvald Stoltenberg, proved 
when he claimed that all Bosnian Muslims were really Serbs, that the United 
Nation officials were far from being impartiaJ.l29 The UNPROFOR commander 
in 1992, Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, gave numerous interviews in 
which he patronized the Bosnians and ignored genocide. After he retired, he 
was paid $18,000 a day by Serbnet, a lobby for radical Serb nationalists, to 
propound his views.130 In addition to taking the Serb side, MacKenzie showed 
willful ignorance as UNPROFOR commander. 
The last thing that a peacekeeper wants to know is the history of 
the region he is going into. It complicates the task of mediation. 
Major-General 
Lewis Mackenzie131 
The most valuable lesson history can teach is that treating a new illness 
with the prescription for an outmoded syndrome can be lethal. The 
Yugoslavian situation called for fresh, innovative initiatives, not old cliches. 
Currently almost everyone regards those decisions as mistaken, many 
find them incredible.132 Vietnam keeps unexpectedly reappearing in American 
127 David Rieff, "The Institution that Saw No Evil," The New Republic, February 12, 1996, p. 20. 
128 Ibid, p. 20. 
129 Ibid, p. 20, and Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 134. 
130 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, p. 209. 
131 Quoted in Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, p. 61. 
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political debate. It is like a ghost in every conflict. Vietnam in Beirut, Vietnam 
in Angola. Vietnam in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, in Somalia. The same 
considerations appeared to be influencing the administration's policy toward 
Yugoslavia: for five years the United States refused to contemplate using 
military force to deter or suppress Serbia's aggressive "ethnic cleansing" policies 
against all other nationalities in breakaway Yugoslavia. 
To some it meant, "Stay out," to the others it said, "Fight this one to win." 
Thus, for all the rhetoric about a "new world order'' that seeks to be on the side 
of those fighting the Husseins and the Milosevics, the administration's fear of 
getting into another Vietnam in the hills of the Balkans has proven more 
decisive. From time to time politicians have proclaimed that Americans finally 
put the Vietnam War behind which in the Balkan conflict after five years and in 
spite of all mistake~ actually happened. But new conflicts have always proven 
them wrong. Vietnam still hovers over every crisis. 
It seems as if a single Vietnam analogy dominated the decision making of 
a generation of leaders, who apply it dissolutelly and uncritically to whatever 
crises arise. In any case, there is reason to heed the warning of the historian who 
wrote: 
Though there is certainly a great deal of truth that 'those who do 
not remember the past are condemned to relive it,' one might also 
132 George Moffett and Jonathan S. Landay, "A War to A void," The Christian Sdence Monitor, 
December 7, 1994, p. 1. For example, Marshall Harris, one of the several State Department 
officials who resigned to protest U.S. policy in the former Yugoslavia said: "It's been a tragedy 
of a hundred errors." 
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be cautioned that those who do not forget the past can be led to 
misapply it.133 
133 K.J. Holyoak and P. Thagard, Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought, p. 157. 
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APPENDIX A. 
The war in the country once known as Yugoslavia raged for nearly five 
years before the leaders of the Western powers acknowledged what had long 
been apparent to any newspaper reader or television viewer: that the U.N. 
presence under the limited rules of engagement and peacekeeping (there where 
the peace did not exist) had the effect only of prolonging the violence rather than 
damping it. 
It should be pointed out that there were realistic opinions and political 
ideas among U.S. policy makers regarding the review of American policy 
toward Yugoslavia, long before the Yugoslav War broke out. Because of their 
importance, in this paper I felt it necessary to include the abbreviated versions of 
the statements of several highly respected U.S. Senators and Representatives 
before the United States Congress. 
CIVIL STRIFE IN YUGOSLAVIA: THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE134 
In the beginning of 1991, six months before the war in Yugoslavia began, 
Senator Robert Dole warned the U.S. Senate for the necessity to intervene in 
Yugoslavia and to prevent war. 
134 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Civil Strife in Yugoslavia: The United States 
Response," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1•t sess., 
February 21, 1991, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. All emphasis 
added. 
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Statement of Honorable Robert Dole, U.S. Senator from Kansas: 
Senator Dole: Mr. Chairman, I think this hearing does 
address a very important policy issue for the United States. In my 
view, the United States urgently needs to review its policy 
toward Yugoslavia to determine the best means for encouraging 
the growth of democracy and restoration of full human and 
individual rights for all of the people in Yugoslavia ... Negotiations 
between the republics and the federal presidency on the future of 
Yugoslavia have to date not yielded any results. I think that is 
because the divisions we see in Yugoslavia today are not only 
ethnic, but political as well, and these political divisions are very 
deep. 
While many people think of the current problems in 
Yugoslavia purely as outgrowths of historical ethnic squabbling, I 
would argue that such a view is overly simplistic ... We cannot 
forget that these nations did not join today's Yugoslavia 
voluntarily .. .! understand that the administration's policy with 
respect to Yugoslavia promotes unity, and I can see that we do not 
want the United States to be a force for disunity. But we need to 
recognize that there cannot be unity in a future Yugoslavia unless it 
is democratic and unless it represents the will of the people in all of 
the republics. It would not be in our interest to have Yugoslavia 
divided within, but united by military force. 
Traveling from Zagreb to Belgrade to Pristina was like 
traveling through a time warp, from a fledgling democracy back to 
the 1950's style communism.135 Our delegation in one afternoon 
got a real taste of what life in Kosovo must be like. The Serbian 
police authorities did not bother to clean up their act for our visit. 
From the windows of our bus, we could see tear gas and clubs 
being used against Albanians who turned out to see us, to wave to 
us, and to chant uu.S.A., U.S.A." ... So, the facts are clear. The issue 
is what can we do and what should we do about it. Needless to 
say, we must keep up diplomatic pressure on the Yugoslav central 
government and on the government of the. Republic of Serbia ... But 
the United States must do more than just react diplomatically. 
We need to provide direct aid to the non Communist republics in 
Yugoslavia thereby bypassing the central government and the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia. We do not want to reward 
either government for its policies of coercion and repression ... 
But as I see it, this is a very historic opportunity to spread 
democracy and make democracy permanent...So, it seems to me it 
is now time for the United States, our Government, the 
135 Mr. Dole led a Senate delegation to Yugoslavia in July 1990. 
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administration, the Congress to get off the sidelines. We 
cannot be spectators, and we ought to come down on the side of 
democracy and human rights and freedom, the same thing all of us 
speak about and talk about from time to time. I think it is very 
important to Yugoslavia. I would like to see the day in Yugoslavia 
where people can live in peace, notwithstanding the dep ethnic 
divisions that have been around for a long, long time, and I believe 
it is possible that we can lay to rest some of the very seri9us 
problems that now exist between the different republics. 
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity 
to testify, and I thank the committee.136 
SANCTIONS LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE YUGOSLAV 
CIVIL WAR, S. 1793137 
In October, 1991, Senators D' Amato and Dole urged again before the U.S. 
Senate for the strong policy step toward Yugoslavia and Serbia. 
York: 
Statement of Honorable Alfonse M. D' Amato, U.S. Senator from New 
Mr. D' Amato: The situation in Yugoslavia has deteriorated 
into civil war. With thousands of Croatians and Slovenians dead 
and hundreds of thousands displaced as a result from the fighting, 
it is my belief that the United States must become involved 
immediately. As the world's lone superpower, it is inexcusable 
that we stand on the sidelines while innocent civilians die and war 
rages throughout Yugoslavia. While I supported the European 
Communities lead role in the crisis at the outset, it is obvious that 
their efforts have brought few results .. .It is my firm belief that the 
United States is the only nation that can send a strong enough 
message to Slobodan Milosevic and his military ... The United States 
has a long history of supporting the forces of freedom against those 
of repression. I believe this is a clear example of a repressive 
136 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Civil Strife in Yugoslavia: The United States 
Response," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1•t sess., 
February 21, 1991, pp. 36-42. All emphasis added. 
137 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Sanctions Legislation Relating to the Yugoslav 
Civil War," S. 1793, 102nd Cong., 1•t sess., October 16, 1991, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1992. All emphasis added. 
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regime which has undertaken a power grab at the expense of 
innocent lives and, potentially, the stability of Europe ... The need 
for the United States to send a strong message to the leadership in 
Yugoslavia is at its apex .. .lt is clear that the present policy of quiet 
diplomatic negotiation has produced minimal results, it is time to 
send a powerful message of U.S. opposition. 
Thank you Mr. Chairman.138 
Statement of Honorable Robert Dole, U.S. Senator from Kansas: 
Mr. Dole: Mr. Chairman, members of the committee ... Time 
is of the essence ... In my view, we have already waited too 
long ... The fact is, Serbian President Milosevic is responsible for the 
tragic situation in Kosova and for orchestrating the war against 
Croatia. The State Department and the European Community have 
clearly indicated that he is indeed working with and supporting 
not only the Serbian guerrillas in Croatia, but the Yugoslav army, 
as well ... 
Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that if we do nothing, 
we will inevitably bear part of the responsibility if the war against 
innocent civilians escalates in Croatia and spreads to other 
republics, such is Bosnia ... You may recall that when I testified 
before your committee earlier this year, I warned that Milosevic' s 
policies of aggression would spread beyond Kosova-that these 
policies were part of a bigger plan. However, some, including the 
administration, claimed I was crying wolf, that it was only a matter 
of time before Milosevic and Communism were swept away in 
Yugoslavia ... Milosevic' s first targets were Kosova and Vojvodina, 
then Slovenia, then Croatia. Bosnia will probably be next ... 
Milosevic and his allies in the Yugoslav army must be 
stopped. And they can be stopped if the United States steps 
forward to assume leadership in this crisis which threatens peace 
and stability in Central Europe. The United States needs to isolate 
Milosevic, the way we isolated Saddam, and continue to isolate 
Fidel. We must move beyond words to action. 
Mr. Chairman, I hope that the committee will give fast and 
favorable consideration to this legislation. Lives are at stake, 
democracy is at stake, and, freedom is at stake.139 
138Jbid, p. 2. 
139 Ibid, PP· 3-4. 
76 
DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND EUROPE-AUGUST 199214° 
A year later, the war in Croatia was going on, and a more homicidal war 
in Bosnia started. The U.S. did not change its politics. On August 4, 1992, Mr. 
Thomas M.T. Niles, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs, held a hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives. After Mr. Niles made short comment on developments in 
Bosnia and the rest of the former Yugoslavia, the Members proceeded for 
questioning. 
Mr. Hamilton: Why not use force for much broader 
purposes in Yugoslavia? 
Mr. Niles: Well, I think that reflects, among other things the 
fact that in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you are essentially 
dealing with a civil war that has been incited by efforts by the 
Serbs to create their own republic ... Under the circumstances I think 
the military authorities, not only those of the United States but 
Western military authorities in general, see some very serious 
problems in intervening more broadly in that conflict. 
Mr. Hamilton: What are those problems? 
Mr. Niles: Well, problems of defining what your 
objectives are, defining what the front is, defining what you 
want to accomplish aside from obviously stopping the conflict. 
Mr. Hamilton: Are we afraid of getting bogged down? 
Mr. Niles: Well, that prospect certainly has been raised. 
Some of the historical experiences of other armies that have been 
involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not suggest that this is a place 
in which one would want to get involved. I think that historical 
experience certainly is on the minds of military authorities, not 
only in the United States but among our Western European 
allies.141 
140 U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Developments in Yugoslavia and Europe-
August 1992," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. 102nd Cong., 
2nd sess., August 4. 1992, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. 
141 Ibid, p. 8. 
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In his testimony, Mr. Niles clearly drew historical analogies of the Second World 
War and the Vietnam War. Members Mr. Lantos and Mr. Kostmayer continued 
discussion and insisted to the explanation for reluctance to intervene. Here are 
some points from their discussions. 
Mr. Lantos: ... And now let us get to the real issues. Munich 
and appeasement keeps reverberating in my mind. The only 
difference between what we have today and what we had a half a 
century ago is that now everything is on television in real time 
globally. So the old excuse that we do not know ... we could say not 
very honestly. But by God, Mr. Niles, there is plenty of 
confirmation. All you have to do is flip on your television set. 
... and months after months after months we get this diplomatic 
garbage saying caution and reluctance, and no proof ... 
Well, let me tell you what the problem is. The problem is 
that there is an election in 90 days, and this election paralyzes the 
administration ... Those little children do not have 90 days. Every 
day will be additional little orphans killed and men tortured, and 
we will continue to say that we are consulting with our allies. 
Neville Chamberlain said that what is happening in 
Czechoslovakia is in a far away land of which we know little. Is 
that what Jim Baker and you are saying today? That this is a far 
away land of which we do not know very much? Because every 
1 0-year-old child knows a great deal about this. All he has to do is 
flip on the television, and see that bus with 50 orphans come under 
fire and then see the 2 little bodies bloodied and dead in a corner ... 
The notion that it is a complex issue is really not an excuse. 
The artillery emplacements surrounding Sarajevo are not that 
difficult to find. Our surveillance can find infinitely smaller items 
on the face of this planet than artillery positions ... The question, Mr. 
Secretary, has been for a long time is do we join in the European 
failure, or do we take a position of leadership? ... Everybody is 
watching what is happening, and the other dictators or would be 
dictators are learning these lessons. Milosevic is still in power. He 
is not a Hitler because he does not have an army to conquer 
Europe. 
What are we afraid of? What is Europe afraid of? What is 
the United Nations afraid of? 
This drama is unfolding on a world stage, and what we get 
is diplomatic double talk. You cannot confirm a single atrocity. 
That is what you told our chairman 5 minutes ago. 
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Is that really what you are saying, Mr. Secretary? ... 
Mr. Kostmayer: ... Unless we do something, it's going to 
continue. And I am here to tell you that unless we do something, 
it's going to get worse. Mark my words, and mark the day I said it 
Unless something changes, unless something is done by us or by 
the U.N., sir, this situation will continue for weeks or for months ... 
You have given a green light to dictators around the world. 
You are sending a message loud and clear that the United States 
will not stand in the way of people who do this. It's just what 
happened before World War IT. Mr. Lantos is absolutely right It's 
a well drawn analogy. It could not be any simpler. 
Mr. Niles: Well, I'm sorry, I don't accept any of that. I'm 
sorry. There is no basis for that analogy. 
Mr. Lantos: Mr. Niles, in this paper to the Senate 
subcommittee you say, "From the beginning of the crisis, we have 
identified the Serbian Government of President Milosevic and its 
allies as the primary culprits." ... Now, in view of this, is the State 
Department ready to call for having Milosevic stand before an 
international tribunal for crimes against humanity? .. . 
Mr. Niles: This is a legal issue, Congressman .. . 
Mr. Kostmayer: Do you think he is? 
Mr. Niles: It doesn't make any difference what I think he is 
or not 
Mr. Kostmayer: Well do you? What do you mean it doesn't 
make any difference? It makes a difference whether the United 
States of America thinks that this man is a war criminal. Of course 
it makes a difference. That's the point.142 
I will conclude this overview with the Levin/Lugar letter to President 
George Bush which was signed by 29 Senators and sent on January 8, 1993. 
Dear Mr. President. 
Actions taken by the United States and the international 
community have failed to stop the aggression and territorial 
expansion of Serbia. The genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing, 
constitutes a crime against humanity that continues to take 
innocent lives and produce thousands of refugees. 
The credibility of the United Nations and international law 
have already been seriously undermined by the failure of the 
142 Ibid, pp. 12-53. 
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community of nations to take stronger actions or even to enforce 
previously adopted resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council. 
We urge you to take a leadership role in formally requesting 
the United Nations Security Council to enforce the nO-fly zone over 
Bosnia and to do so even if other members of the Security Council 
threaten to veto such actions. 
Sincerely, [followed by 29 names].143 
This letter was sent to the President in January, 1993, 20 months after the 
Serb aggression on Slovenia and Croatia, and 10 months after the Serb attack on 
Bosnia:. 
Only I can say is to repeat my fellow-combatant words sentenced during 
the war: "There is no other explanation: even the American President must be 
Serb!" 
143 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on Current 
Military Operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia," 103rd Cong .. 1st sess., January 29, 1993, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 106-7. 
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